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Abstract 
Theories of fiscal federalism state that the “redistribution branch” of the government should be 
attributed to the central level in order to prevent social policy competition. However, when preferences 
are diverse and production factors are not perfectly mobile decentral redistribution provision may be 
optimal.  
But, social security policy consists of more than redistribution. In this paper the traditional fiscal 
federalism literature is enriched by extending the traditional framework with five functions of social 
security: horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurance based on income solidarity, risk solidarity 
and solidarity of chance. The optimal attribution of competences within the European Union is 
theoretically analysed from a public economic approach. Hence, the relevant factors that determine 
the optimal decision level for social security are evaluated and related to the empirical economic 
literature. 
Explicit attention is paid to co-ordination methods as a solution between a completely central or 
decentral provision of social security. This is an application of the proportionality requirement of 
European policies as laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. 
It is analysed for which social security functions and under which circumstances delayed integration, 
the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), minimum harmonisation standards, matching grants and 
flexible integration may be welfare enhancing. 
The analysis shows that for redistribution as well as for insurances based on income solidarity, 
delayed integration may be a reasonable compromise between efficient allocative mobility and 
inefficient social security tourism. Furthermore, the OMC can provide some economies of scale by 
policy learning, without an inefficient transposition of power to the European level.  
Paradoxically, the least “social” functions of social security seem to be the first, for which integration 
may increase welfare. E.g. flexible integration may be useful for supplementary pensions for mobile 
workers, where economies of scale could be reached. However, this contrasts sharply with several 
proposals put forward to achieve more positive integration. A “Social Europe” may be a political 
dream. From a public economic approach, it is inefficient economics. 
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Part 1: Research question and approach 
 
“The sense that emerges from a traditional fiscal-federalism perspective on the emerging 
public sector in Europe is thus an uneasy one. It suggests that the central government is 
not well equipped to take the leading role in addressing Musgrave’s redistribution and 
stabilisation functions. Moreover, the individual nations find themselves with a much 
diminished capacity to do these jobs. Thus, the emerging European public sector may 
find its structure rather ill-suited to performing two of the traditional tasks of public 
finance.” 
 
Oates (2001, p. 142, 143) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades there has been an intense debate about the role and functions the 
European Union (EU) should perform. After the establishment of the European 
Community of Coal and Steel in 1951, the EU expanded with 19 new member states and 
performed an ever-increasing role in different policy areas. The introduction of the 
Economic Monetary Union in 1999, the Lisbon Agenda in 2001 and the discussion about 
the European Constitution in 2005 all show that the debate about the competence of the 
European Union is still very much alive. 
In the light of the ongoing European economic integration, the rise of India and China as 
new global economic powers and the consequences of an ageing population, now the 
debates tend to focus on the socio-economic models of the member states, in particular 
the welfare states and the different systems of social security. 
 
Several authors pledge for a “Social Europe” as a countervailing power against the 
market-preserving role that Europe has played in the last decennia (Scharpf, 2002; 
Delsen, 2002; Chapon and Euzéby, 2002). Thereby, with the Lisbon Agenda the EU 
made reducing “social exclusion” a policy goal. Different authors have proposed to 
Europeanize different social policy instruments. Yet a coherent analysis of whether it 
may be welfare improving to provide social security at the European level and -if this is 
the case- which instruments can be used, is lacking (Cantillon, 2006). In this paper, these 
issues are assessed from a public economic approach. This implies that the maximisation 
of total welfare is the yardstick to measure whether it is good or not to centralise social 
security policies. This is done by an analysis of the public economic literature and some 
studies that show empirical evidence. 
 
The public economic approach used in this paper is normative: the analysis is about the 
optimal division of responsibilities. Further, it is theoretical. The approach is used to 
extent the traditional fiscal federalism framework with the functions of social security. 
Using a public economic approach implies that maximising social welfare is the 
normative framework.1 Social welfare can be defined as the sum of the utilities of all 
individuals in society, i.e. the Bentham moral principle is followed.2 These utilities may 
also depend on the utilities of others, which e.g. is the case when individuals are 
altruistic. 
Using a public economic approach also implies that political, ideological or strategic 
motives for providing social security on a central level are not considered.  
Since the amount of literature on this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, no explicit 
attention is paid to the raising of taxes to provide social security also.3  
In order to prevent social policy competition, theories of fiscal federalism state that the 
“redistribution branch” of the government should be attributed to the central level.  
                                                 
1 Indeed, (implicitly) the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is used. This implies that (de)centralisation is welfare 
improving if the total gains are higher than the total costs, so that (theoretically) the potential losers could 
be compensated by the winners. 
2 See for a description of this and other normative approaches Tannsjo (2002). 
3 However, inevitably in the theoretical analysis the issue of tax raising to provide social security is 
sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly mentioned. In the empirical overview, no attention is paid to 
this. 
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However, when preferences are diverse and production factors are not perfectly mobile 
decentral redistribution provision may be optimal.  
 
Therefore, the central questions of this paper are:  
 
1) What is the optimal way to divide responsibilities between different government 
levels for social security provision in Europe from a public economic approach? 
 
and 
 
2) In the light of the first question: what judgement should be made to several 
proposals done to develop a “Social Europe”? 
 
To answer these questions, the traditional fiscal federalism literature is enriched by 
extending the traditional framework with five functions of social security: horizontal and 
vertical redistribution and insurance based on income solidarity, risk solidarity and 
solidarity of chance. The optimal attribution of competences within the European Union 
is theoretically analysed from a public economic approach. Hence, the relevant factors 
that determine the optimal decision level for social security are evaluated and related to 
the empirical economic literature. 
Thereby attention is paid to alternatives for a complete (de)central provision of 
instruments of social security. This can be seen as an application of the proportionality of 
measures as defined in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997).  
The extension of the traditional fiscal federalism to five functions of social security will 
provide the answer to the first research question and is the first contribution to the 
economic literature. 
Next, several proposals to develop a “Social Europe” will be evaluated, after which it will 
be argued which functions of social security policy could in what way be attributed to the 
EU. Suggestions are done for further research with respect to the specific implementation 
of these cooperation measures. This can be seen as a second contribution to the scientific 
literature. 
 
This paper is organised in five parts and consists of twelve chapters. Part I elaborates the 
research questions (chapter 1), the approach (chapter 1) and defines the social security 
concept (chapter 2).  
Part II analysis factors that are relevant to determine the optimal decision level for social 
security from a traditional fiscal federalism approach. Chapter 3 provides an introduction 
to the fiscal federalism literature. Then, two chapters are devoted to the redistribution 
functions of social security. Chapter 4 focuses on asymmetric information, the uniformity 
condition and preference matching. Chapter 5 considers the mobility of production 
factors. Chapter 6 focuses on the relevant factors that determine the optimal decision 
level for social security based on insurance. In chapter 7 attention is paid to political 
economy considerations, which are important for both functions of social security. 
The different forms of cooperation between governments are discussed and assessed in 
part III and chapter 8. 
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Part IV provides an answer to the research questions. The traditional fiscal federalism 
literature is extended with the functions of social security based on the empirical evidence 
for the EU. This evidence is discussed in chapter 9. In chapter 10 the extended framework 
is presented. Chapter 11 assesses some current proposals to develop a “Social Europe” by 
using the developed extended framework. 
Final conclusions are formulated in part V and chapter 12 and suggestions for further 
research are put forward. 
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2. Social security 
Before extending the fiscal federalism framework to assess whether it is welfare 
enhancing to provide social security at the European level, social security should be 
defined. This is what will be done in this chapter. 
 
2.1 Defining social security 
Before analysing whether it is optimal to centralise or decentralise social security policies 
in Europe, social security should be defined. This is done by defining social security on 
the basis of the two main functions social security performs: redistribution and 
insurance.4 
 
Redistribution 
Redistribution between individuals can be divided in two kinds. First, there is vertical 
redistribution between the rich and the poor ex ante. Means are redistributed from the rich 
to the poor. This happens for instance with social assistance programs and by progressive 
taxation. The other form is characterised by horizontal redistribution between groups. 
Money is transferred from e.g. people without children to people with children.  
 
Insurance 
The other function of social security is insurance. The difference between insurance and 
redistribution is that the first happens ex ante, while the last occurs after a certain event 
has occurred. Redistribution is a transfer of money between different groups ex ante, 
while insurance consists of money transfers from the lucky to the unlucky after some pre-
specified event has occurred.5 
For social insurance to be efficient there must be some degree of risk aversion, otherwise 
there are no gains from insurance. Because of market imperfections, the market cannot 
provide this insurance, so there is a role for the government to do this. Market 
imperfections are e.g. a high correlation between negative shocks and the adverse 
selection problem that. An instrument related to the first one is unemployment insurance: 
when there is an economic downturn, private firms may not be able to provide the 
benefits promised (and if they are, they have to build inefficient high amounts of 
reserves). An example of the second one is e.g. the fact that a substantial amount of risks 
is immediately clear after a child has been born; while private insurers are not able to 
oblige people to insure themselves, government can (Sinn, 1997). 
 
Goudswaard (2005) distinguishes three kinds of social insurance. The first one is social 
insurance based on reciprocity. People pay an actuarial fair amount to insure them against 
some potentially hazardous event. Redistribution happens ex post from people who did 
not have to deal with the event to people who did. This is solidarity of chance. 
In a second form of solidarity, redistribution occurs before the event has happened. This 
can be done in two ways. First, when the risks of an event happening are unequal 
                                                 
4 De Mooij (2006) describes the welfare state by the three functions that it provides: redistribution, 
insurance and reallocation over the life cycle. The last one is important in welfare state arrangements, see 
e.g. Nelissen (1998). However, reallocation over the life cycle has always an insurance and / or a 
redistributive element. 
5 However, as becomes clear further on, insurance can also have redistributive elements ex ante. 
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between people while these risks are not completely accounted for in the premiums. This 
is called risk solidarity. A second form is income solidarity: premiums are based on the 
income that people earn: irrespective of the expected risks, people with higher incomes 
pay higher premiums than people with lower incomes. 
There are usually two important behavioural consequences of providing insurance. The 
first is moral hazard. Because people are insured, they change their behaviour. They do 
not bear the full consequences of their decisions. Therefore they have an incentive to take 
more risks than they would have done otherwise. Insurance givers can reduce this risk in 
different ways. A no-claim bonus or introducing payments when the insurance is used is 
one. Another way is monitoring if moral hazard occurs and punishing.  
Adverse selection may occur when only the high-risk people want (full) insurance. This 
leads to high costs, since premiums must be high. In the end the standard Akerlof (1970) 
result may be there, where no insurance is offered anymore. A less extreme outcome may 
be when a separating equilibrium results: people who face different risks get different 
insurances packages. People who face high risks have to pay more for the same insurance 
or pay the same for insurances with worse conditions. Compared with (obliged) general 
insurances, separating risk groups therefore reduces income and / or risk solidarity of 
insurance mechanisms. 
 
Bismarck versus Beveridge 
Social security systems can be based on different principles and mechanisms. 
Bismarckian social insurance based on reciprocity is one. Another one is income 
maintenance following the Beveridgean tradition.6 
Social insurance following the Bismarckian view means that people insure themselves 
against uncertainty and pay a contribution for an insurance scheme. Examples are 
pensions, unemployment insurance, survivor benefits and disability insurance. Welfare 
states that are to a relative large extent based on contribution schemes are often called 
Bismarckian systems.  
The second vision on social security is income maintenance. A minimum level of 
subsistence must be guaranteed to all people. This is the Beveridgean system. When 
people loose their job, retire, become disabled, et cetera the state finances their 
(minimum) income by taxes. So, there is no relation between contributions and the level 
of insurance as in the Bismarckian system. The government provides a minimum level of 
existence. 
Another element of social security can be the provision of services: as health care, social 
work and reintegration programs to work. 
 
Redistribution as social insurance 
Social security can be divided into two main groups: redistribution and insurance. When 
we go back to Rawls and look at his theory about the veil of ignorance that could be the 
basis for social security, it is impossible to make such a clear distinction. Or as Sinn 
(1996, p. 262) states: “Understanding redistribution as insurance is simply a matter of 
making judgement before the veil of ignorance has been lifted”. Varian (1980) considers 
redistributive taxes as a social insurance mechanism. He assumes that ex ante income 
                                                 
6 Or as Clasen and Van Oorschot (2002) call it: the principle of need (Beveridge) versus the principle of 
reciprocity (Bismarck). 
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differences are only the consequences of luck as Rawls supposed. The lucky, who earn 
much money, transfer money to the unlucky, the poor. Varian (1980) distinguishes three 
important consequences of redistribution: 1) the equity effect of changing distribution of 
income; 2) the efficiency effect, which comes from negative incentive effects; 3) the 
(positive) insurance effect. Varian (1980) shows with his simple model that with risk 
averse agents and no social security, over-saving occurs. Preventing over-saving and 
delivering insurance outweigh the incentive costs of redistribution in this model.  
Varian also states that redistribution and insurance are interrelated: “Indeed, I suspect that 
widespread political support of many redistributive programs rests more with the social 
insurance aspect of the program than with altruistic consideration involving social 
welfare (Varian, 1980; p. 51)”. This is related to the literature that considers social 
security policy as insurance mechanism, which induces risk-taking behaviour and 
therefore welfare.7 
Sinn (1996) even stresses that the distinction made between insurance and redistribution 
is misleading. He provides two reasons. First if redistribution induces risk taking pre-tax 
income differences will increase, because risk taking increases the gap between those 
who win and those who lose. Second, an unequal society means more risks for especially 
young entrants, who do not know what their labour position will be in the future. This 
also increases the need for insurance. 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
When considering social security functions it is impossible to make a sharp distinction 
between different instruments of social security. Indeed, all instruments have elements of 
both approaches and the relative importance of the functions depends on the precise 
(national) characteristics of the instruments. Defined benefit occupational pensions have 
more solidarity elements than pension systems that are based on defined contribution 
(Bovenberg, 2003). Child benefits can be provided depending on income or not.  
Furthermore insurance and redistribution are interrelated. It does not matter for the 
incentives people face when they become unemployed if they get money from an 
insurance (unemployment benefit) or from a redistribution mechanism (social assistance). 
However, theoretically and practically it remains interesting to separate the different 
functions of social security.  
Two main models can be distinguished: an insurance-based, Bismarckian and a minimum 
level of existence based, Beveridgean. Furthermore, five functions of social security can 
be theoretically separated: horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurance based on 
income solidarity, risk solidarity and reciprocity.  
Of course, it is not possible to attribute the instruments of social security exclusively to 
the five functions. Almost all instruments have elements of both approaches and the five 
functions and the relative importance of the function depends on the precise 
characteristics of the instruments. However, a categorisation of the different instruments 
in different groups is helpful when further analysing the optimal decision level for social 
security provision theoretically. The overview of the five functions and examples of 
social security instruments provided in table 1 will therefore be used to develop the 
extended fiscal federalism framework in this paper. 
                                                 
7 See for a theoretical analysis of social security as an investment tool Arachi and D’Antoni (2004) and 
Sinn (1996). For an empirical confirmation of this idea, see Rodrik (1998) and Bird (2002). 
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Table 1: Redistribution and insurance   
 
 Redistribution Insurance 
Ex ante vertical risk solidarity 
 social assistance health insurance 
  unemployment insurance 
  disability insurance 
 horizontal income solidarity 
 child benefits public old age pensions 
   
Ex post  solidarity of chance 
  supplementary pensions 
 
In part I the research question, the approach and the applied concept of social security 
were defined. In this paper fiscal federalism theory will be extended by the five functions 
of social security described in this chapter. This way, the optimal way to divide 
responsibilities between different government levels for social security provision in 
Europe could be found. Before we can extent this framework, we will analyse the 
traditional fiscal federalism theory. Furthermore specific attention must be paid to the 
insurance functions of social security. This will be done in part II of this paper. 
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Part II: Analysing relevant factors 
 
 
“The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages 
which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations…” “…In great centralised 
nations the legislator is obliged to give a character of uniformity to the laws, which does 
not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts; as he takes no cognisance of 
special cases, he can only proceed upon general principles… since legislation cannot 
adapt itself to the exigencies and the customs of the population, which is a great cause of 
trouble and misery”. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville in 1830 as cited by Oates (2005, p. 353) 
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3. Traditional fiscal federalism 
 
In Part II of this paper the relevant factors to determine the optimal decision level with 
respect to social security are analysed.  
In this chapter, the theoretical outline of the public economic approach to the optimal 
decision level for the “redistribution branch” is sketched. Attention is paid to the 
traditional fiscal federalism theories and the factors that are relevant to determine the 
optimal decision level. Further, it is argued that for the insurance part of social security 
the efficient risk pool, moral hazard and adverse selection are in the heart of the 
discussion. 
Political economy considerations are of importance for both functions of social security. 
These issues are generally introduced in this chapter. In chapters 4-7 they are considered 
in greater detail. 
 
3.1 Fiscal Federalism 
The traditional public economic approach of Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) is that 
redistribution must be provided at the central level. Musgrave (1959) divided three main 
“branches” of the central government: the allocation, the stabilisation and the 
redistributive function. The author stated that the allocation function should be attributed 
to the local government, because it has more information about local preferences than the 
central government.8 Therefore, it is able to provide a better tax-public good mix than a 
central government can do. The stabilising role, however, could better be performed by 
the central government. Inflation, macro-economic stabilisation policies, exchange rates, 
and stabile economic growth, could better be provided on a central level. Decentral 
decisions could work against each other and reduce welfare, while co-ordination could 
improve policies and enhance welfare. 
Redistribution, according to Musgrave, should be provided at the central level because of 
the threat of a social race to the bottom. A social race to the bottom occurs when rich 
people move to local governments that raise lower taxes and provide lower redistribution 
levels. This would result in smaller tax bases for “high tax-high redistribution” 
governments and therefore an unavoidable decline in redistribution. At the same time, 
poor people try to migrate to (local) governments with a generous redistributive system, 
which puts the ‘high tax-high benefit’ system under pressure. As such, in the presence of 
labour and / or capital mobility, tax competition with low redistribution can be the result. 
When redistribution is provided at the central level, policy competition will not occur. 
This means that there is room for the provision of a certain, nationally determined, 
amount of redistribution. Traditional economists assume that this is welfare improving. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Of course only parts of the allocation function should be attributed to decentral governments. When there 
are goods that are characterised by economies of scale and / or externalities it may be optimal to provide 
these public goods at the central level. 
  Chapter 3: Traditional fiscal federalism 
 19
With respect to the “allocation branch” of the government Oates’ decentralisation 
theorem is relevant. This implies that decisions should be taken at the decentral level, 
unless it is optimal to decide on the central level. Oates (1972) argued that a decentral 
provision of local public goods must be preferred to a national provision of public goods, 
because preferences for public goods differ between regions. Regions can accommodate 
these different preferences, while the central government is supposed to deliver a uniform 
level of public goods.  
 
Figure 1: Oates’ decentralisation theorem 
 
       Source: Bailey (1999) 
   
This is shown in figure 1, where people in the different regions A and B have different 
preferences for a public good. On the vertical axis we see the (marginal) costs and 
benefits and on the horizontal axis the amount of the public goods. The demand curves of 
the people in region and A and B are given. Region A wants less public goods than 
region B. When both decide by themselves the optimum is found: where marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits (where the horizontal marginal cost curve is crossed). When the 
central government C has to provide a uniform level of public goods in all regions, it 
chooses to provide less than the inhabitants of B want and more than the inhabitants of A.  
Therefore, a dead weight loss of the two black triangles results.9 It is shown that the 
optimal amount of public goods will not be provided. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 A dead weight loss is a loss in social welfare due to a non-optimal equilibrium in markets. Pareto-
improvements are than possible to reach, which implies that (some) people can be better off without 
making other people worse off.  
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The decentralisation theorem is perfectly in line with the subsidiarity principle laid down 
in current European policies (see box 1). 
 
Box 1: Oates’ decentralisation theorem and the subsidiarity principle 
Oates’ (1972) decentralisation theorem, which states that decisions should be taken at the 
decentral level, unless it is optimal to do this at the central level, is completely in line 
with Europe’s subsidiarity principle. This principle was laid down in article 5 of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) and later in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), because Germany 
and the United Kingdom were afraid of too much European influence on national policy 
domains (Ederveen et al., 2006).  
 
Article 5 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997): 
“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed actions cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaty”. 
 
According to some economists the decentralisation theorem can be applied to 
redistribution (Pauly, 1973). Regions could have different preferences for the amount of 
redistribution that should be provided. Following the decentralisation theorem, when 
redistribution is provided at the central level, decentral governments are not able to 
accommodate these preferences and a dead weight loss results. Yet other economists 
claim that central governments do not have to provide uniform levels of public goods to 
all decentral governments (Lockwood, 2002; Besley and Coate, 2003). If preferences are 
dissimilar, the central government may provide different levels of public goods to 
different local governments.  
Economists usually assume that decentral governments have more information about 
local preferences than national governments. Revealing the real preferences of local 
citizens is more difficult when decision-makers are “further away” from their voters. 
 
Redistribution provided on a decentral level may have effects on other jurisdictions. This 
can be the case with interdependent utility functions and / or when labour and or capital 
are mobile. When there are positive or negative externalities induced by local 
government behaviour there may be a case for central co-ordination. Furthermore, 
economies of scale may exist when central governments provide social security. 
Providing social security on a central level may lower average costs. This strengthens the 
case for a central provision of public goods (Ederveen et al., 2006).  
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Insurance 
However, these economies of scale may be especially relevant with respect to insurance. 
Risk sharing may lead to a more efficient risk pool and can therefore be an argument for 
centralising.  
 
With respect to insurance mechanisms moral hazard and adverse selection are important 
to consider. Indeed, when people are insured they may change behaviour and act more 
risky than they would do without insurance (moral hazard). Monitoring behaviour may 
reduce this negative effect. Furthermore people who face more risks may want to insure 
themselves, while low risk people do not (adverse selection). This may prevent the 
market from creating insurances: an incomplete market results. The government can 
resolve this problem by obliged participation. 
 
Political economy 
Furthermore political economy considerations are important to determine the optimal 
decision level for social security. These models include decision procedures, asymmetric 
information and government behaviour (Oates, 2005). It is important how governmental 
behaviour is estimated. When a government is seen as a benevolent utility-maximiser the 
results from analyses regarding the optimal responsibilities of different governments is 
different than when a government is seen as a Leviathan. 
The government environment is also of importance. Capture, lobbying and corruption 
may reduce efficient decision making by (de)central governments.  
Furthermore the specific constitutional design is important when evaluating the optimal 
decision level for social security. 
 
3.2 Conclusion 
Traditional models of fiscal federalism show that a lot of factors may be important to 
determine the optimal decision level for redistribution. Different assumptions within 
models may lead to different conclusions about the optimal provision of redistribution. 
Indeed, when labour and capital are mobile it may be efficient to centralise redistribution 
functions. But what are the consequences when at the same time preferences differ 
between member states and Europe can only provide a “one size fits all” (uniform) level? 
And what if asymmetric information is a substantial problem? 
By using theoretical economic models these problems are considered in greater detail. In 
chapter 4 attention is paid to asymmetric information, the uniformity condition and 
difference in preferences. In chapter 5 the consequences of mobile production factors on 
the optimal distribution of responsibilities with respect to redistribution is looked in 
greater detail. 
Chapter 6 pays attention to factors that are especially relevant for social security 
functions that are based on insurance. Chapter 7 investigates the political economy 
considerations and its effects on the optimal provision for social security in greater detail. 
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4. Asymmetric information, uniformity and preferences 
Different factors are relevant to determine the optimal decision level for redistribution in 
the European Union. In chapters 4 and 5, economic theory about these factors is 
discussed. Each analysis is based on different assumptions, which implies that it is not 
possible to separate one relevant factor on its own, without making assumptions about 
the other factors. However, it is tried to get insight in the mechanisms behind the effects 
that different factors have by investigating different models more closely.  
In this chapter attention is focussed on the relevance of asymmetric information, the 
uniformity condition and differences in preferences. In chapter 5 the relevance of the 
mobility of production factors is analysed. 
 
4.1 Asymmetric information 
In this section a closer look is taken at the asymmetric information that is assumed to 
exist between governments. As was argued by Oates: local governments are more aware 
of the preferences of the local population. Therefore, when there are no spillovers, local 
governments can provide public goods with fewer distortions than the federal 
government can do. The traditional Tiebout (1956) paper is often referred to in the debate 
about this issue. Tiebout reacted on the seminal article of Samuelson (1954) about the 
optimal provision of public goods. In his article, Samuelson stated that the optimal 
provision of public goods is found when its costs equal the sum of the marginal social 
welfare in society. He ended his analysis with the sentence (p. 389): “The solution 
“exists”; the “problem” is how to find it”. Tiebout claimed that he was able to find that 
solution. When people are mobile and free to choose the district where they want to live 
they can “vote with their feet” and search the government that exactly acts according to 
their preferences. The optimum tax-public goods combination is then found. 
The Tiebout hypothesis got a lot of attention. However, the assumptions are very strong 
and not realistic; leading to a hollow claim that Samuelsons’ solution was found. Tiebout 
assumed e.g. no mobility costs and no employment restrictions, perfect information and 
the inexistence of external effects.  
The discussion about the optimal provision of public goods and how to provide them has 
never ended since. The same holds for the asymmetric information argument raised by 
Oates.  
 
Asymmetric information with factor mobility and grants10 
Raff and Wilson (1997) analyse that with well-informed local governments it may be 
optimal to decentralise income redistribution, even when the beneficiaries are quite 
mobile. They divide two types of incomplete information. The well-known differences in 
tastes for redistribution and the “ability” to redistribute income, which are based on 
differences in production functions. The authors investigate matching grants by the 
central government in a model with factor mobility. The central government has to deal 
with moral hazard and adverse selection by local governments, which are high and low 
productive (which is not known by the central government). 
Among other things, distortionary different grants must be given to mobile workers to 
compensate landowners in inefficient government regions. A centralised redistribution 
                                                 
10 Matching grants are analysed as a cooperation method in chapter 8 extensively. However, here is the 
focus on the theoretical relevance of the a-symmetric information argument. 
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policy has considerable costs that can hardly be outweighed by the benefits of a decentral 
provision. 
Cremer and Pestiau (1996), in a simple model, come to a similar conclusion. They 
consider two countries, one rich and one poor, with different proportions of rich and poor 
people. A full-informed utility maximising central government equals income in both 
countries.11 However with asymmetric information the rich country gets the full level of 
redistribution.12 The poorer country does not, which results in less redistribution to the 
poorest people. In a decentral framework countries choose equal incomes in their 
countries, but because a rich and a poor country are considered these income levels are 
not the same.  
 
When decentral governments have more information than central governments –which is 
usually assumed- this can be an argument for decentralisation. Indeed, as several authors 
show, central governments can not –or at a high price- reach the same welfare outcome as 
decentral governments. 
 
4.2 Uniformity 
After assessing the asymmetric information argument, the uniformity condition for 
central governments is analysed. Oates (1972) states that when there are spillovers a 
trade-off between central or local provision of public goods exists between heterogeneity 
in tastes and the degree of spillovers.13 Also, when there are economies of scale, they 
should be outweighed by the heterogeneity argument to make local provision more 
efficient (Alesina et al., 1995). However as Besley and Coate (2003) state, the crucial 
underlying assumption is that the central government can make no difference in the 
provision of public goods between regions. There is a uniformity condition. They argue 
that this is a stringent restriction, because central governments are able to redistribute 
between governments. Of course, the driving factor is the information asymmetry 
between central and local governments that is assumed. In this section the relevance of 
the uniformity condition is investigated further. 
 
Besley and Coate (2003) develop a political economy model in which it is possible for 
the central government to provide different levels of public goods in different regions. 
Nevertheless, a political problem results. Indeed, representatives try to get most of the 
central budget for their region. Minimum coalitions divide the cake. Centralised decision 
comes in their model with the costs of misallocation (spending is skewed towards the 
regions of the winning representatives) and uncertainty about the outcome. Moreover, 
voters in the regions vote strategically (they do not reveal their true preferences) to give 
their representative a good bargaining position. These costs must be weighed against the 
benefits of a central co-ordination of spillovers. Of course, when spillovers are low the 
misallocation problem is relatively big. Indeed, when local public goods provided by the 
                                                 
11 In this simple model incomes are given exogenously and taxes are non-distorting. 
12 In micro-economic terms: with incomplete information, the self-selection constraint must be binding and 
therefore there is no distortion at the top. 
13 Spillovers are a synonym for externalities: effects on others than the decision maker (or economic agent) 
that are not taken into account when an economic transaction is made. 
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central government have less positive externalities, the negative consequences of the non-
cooperative minimum winning coalition are greater.  
Besley and Coate (2003) show that in this model central government intervention may be 
efficient when there are relative small spillovers, while Oates (1972) stated that with 
spillovers decentral government intervention is always preferable (with identical 
districts). On the other hand, when comparing local heterogeneity and spillover levels, 
the authors show that in this political economy model the case for centralisation is 
weaker. Indeed, heterogeneity in regions leads to greater consequences for the choices 
made by the minimum winning coalition, which weakens the case for central public 
goods provision. 
When looking at a cooperative central government (a benevolent, social welfare 
maximising government), one gets to deal with strategic voters. Voters send their 
representatives to the cooperative bargaining table with a message that does not represent 
their true preferences. So, while the representatives are cooperative, non-cooperative 
solutions result, which weakens the case for centralisation. 
Despite that, Besley and Coate (2003) conclude that spillovers and heterogeneity are still 
in the heart of the debate about the responsibilities of the different government levels. 
However, the reason is not the standard Oates approach, where the central government is 
not able to provide different levels of public goods in different regions, but the political 
economy of decision-making.  
 
As Besley and Coate (2003), Lockwood (2002) amends the uniformity assumption of 
Oates (1973).14 The author develops a political economy model with heterogeneous 
preferences between regions (but not within). There are two kinds of externalities: 
positive (the standard externalities of public goods) and negative ones (cost sharing, 
because the central government is able to tax different regions differently). Lockwood 
looks at public good projects that can get a majority of votes in a Condorcet winner 
model.15 Lockwood uses the Hicks-Kaldor criterion to determine when decentralisation is 
more efficient. This implies that decentralisation is preferred over centralisation when 
total output is higher. The losers can be fully compensated by the gains of 
decentralisation. The author shows that when there are no externalities, decentralisation is 
preferred (which is the usual outcome). However, when externalities increase it is not 
always the case that centralisation is more efficient. Because of the bargaining system at 
the central government level, it may be more efficient to provide public goods at the local 
level. The reason is that uniformity costs are not the issue, but the lack of responsiveness 
of decision-making to project benefits is. When a great set of projects in this Condorcet 
setting is considered, central governments can reject efficient projects.  
                                                 
14 Later, Oates (2005) argues that there are two main arguments, which may lead to uniform provision of 
public goods at the central level: a-symmetric information (about the local cost functions and preferences) 
and political considerations (where each region wants its part of the cake). 
15 The Condorcet winner method is an election method in which people rank candidates against each other. 
People in regions rank candidates. Then, there is an investigation which candidate is preferred more against 
the other candidates in each region. The candidate that is preferred most is the Condorcet winner. Of 
course, there are a lot of other systems to determine winners (absolute vote counts, ranked pairs, majority 
voting, et cetera), which can generate other outcomes. 
 Chapter 4: Asymmetric information, uniformity and preferences 
 25
Furthermore, the author shows that a decentral provision of public goods is never Pareto-
improving because of the presence of the cost externality.16 Some regions will always 
lose from decentralisation. On the other hand, central provision of public goods is Pareto-
efficient when regions are sufficiently homogeneous and there are strong positive 
externalities. 
The author also discusses the voting for the division of responsibilities between different 
government levels. Lockwood (2002) shows that with a majority rule, a majority will 
vote for decentralisation when there are no externalities and less cost externalities. When 
the positive externalities are big enough and there are not too many differences in cost 
externalities, voters choose for centralisation. However, when unanimity is needed when 
centralisation is the starting point, this will never change. When decentral decision-
making is the initial situation, centralisation occurs when positive externalities are big 
and regions are sufficiently homogeneous. As could be expected, a unanimity rule leaves 
the initial situation almost always unchanged. 
As Besley and Coate (2003), Lockwood (2002) concludes that the main message of Oates 
still remains. However, the analysis to come to this conclusion differs. Not uniformity of 
central government provision, but the political choice process and (positive and negative) 
externalities that have their influence on that process are the driving factors of this result. 
 
4.3 Preferences 
Differences in preferences are relevant to two extents with respect to redistribution. First, 
it is relevant if preferences for redistribution within a central (or supranational in the case 
of the EU) government are characterised by generally or locally determined preferences 
for redistribution. When people’s interdependent share of utility only depends on the 
welfare of people with their nationality, redistribution can be seen as a local public good. 
Increasing the welfare of people abroad will then have no consequences for the social 
welfare in the country of origin.  
If people’s preferences for redistribution are based on the utility of all people within the 
central government, redistribution can be marked as a central public good. Due to 
(international) interdependences externalities will arise when decentral governments 
change redistribution policies. Indeed, the utility of people in other countries will change 
in that case. Lower redistribution levels will reduce the utility of these people, higher 
levels increase these utilities. The existence of external effects from decentral policy-
making may from a public economic approach be an argument for central government 
intervention. The costs and benefits of decentral policy decisions can then be internalised.     
Of course, it is also possible that preferences for redistribution are based on a 
combination of these two. E.g. in Pauly’s (1973) model preferences for redistribution 
depend on the distance from persons: the further down persons live away, the lower the 
preferences for redistribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The definition of Pareto-improvements was given in footnote 9. 
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A second difference in preferences can be given by the amount of redistribution that 
should be provided. Dutch people may have preferences for more redistribution than 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom. The decentralisation theorem may than suggest that a 
decentral provision of redistribution is welfare enhancing (because of the reduction in 
dead weight loss). However, it may also be the case that the preferences for redistribution 
are based on (general) European preferences for horizontal and vertical redistribution.  
 
Intradistrict differences 
Of course, preferences within member states can also differ. Indeed, this may lead to 
nuanced conclusions with respect to the optimal decision level for redistribution. Akai 
and Mikamie (2006) developed a political economy model with a majority rule. They 
went back to the classical Oates assumptions without economies of scale, spillovers and a 
uniform provision of public goods to local people by the central government. Further, no 
mobility is assumed. However, the authors assume that besides different preferences 
between regions, there are also differences in preferences of inhabitants within a region. 
The authors show that in this model the median voter always has preferences to over 
provide public goods. Still, they show that if the intradistrict heterogeneity is big enough 
it is possible that a central government has fewer distortions. Indeed, the average can be 
better for the minorities in the local governments, than what the median voter in their 
district wants. The bigger the minorities, the greater the benefits from centralisation.  
 
Motivation 
Next to the two kinds of preferences, the motivation for preferences can differ. Altruism, 
but also own interests by reducing negative externalities of the poor (e.g. stealing, 
disturbing live environments, making noise) can be motivations for the rich to 
redistribute. Thereby, redistribution has elements of insurance for “If a certain event will 
happen” and can be motivated by well-understood self-interest (Sinn, 1996). In all these 
cases the preferences of the rich –by different motivations- determine the redistribution 
levels. However, it is also possible that the poor act in their own interest and try to reap 
benefits from the rich in a political economy context. This may lead to different 
outcomes, as will be shown in the next chapters.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
Asymmetric information is an important determinant when assessing the optimal decision 
level for redistribution. When decentral governments are better able to reveal the 
preferences of the population, this may give arguments for decentralisation. The articles 
analysed in this chapter show that in political economy contexts asymmetric information 
problems between politicians, government levels and voters are in the heart of the debate 
of the optimal decision level. In chapter 7 more attention is paid to the effects political 
economy considerations can have on the optimal decision level with respect to social 
security. 
 
The uniformity condition as such does not seem to be that relevant, but political economy 
considerations may replace this condition with the same result. Or as Oates (2005) 
argued: the uniformity condition is still relevant, because central governments do not 
have information about local preferences and cost functions and because of political 
considerations. Concordantly, there remains a trade-off between heterogeneity in 
preferences and spillovers between the different member states. 
 
Since the public economic approach is taken, it is important to consider the specific 
utility functions of people.17 When redistributive concerns are only determined on the 
member states’ level, this may be an argument for decentralisation. However, when 
people derive utility from the wealth of other Europeans, there may be arguments for a 
European intervention. When preferences for redistribution within the EU are 
independent of the nationality of people, a central redistribution seems welfare 
enhancing, if negative externalities can be reduced.  
Thereby, it is important to consider if the amount of redistribution that different people 
prefer differs. Preference matching as argument for decentralisation can then increase in 
importance. At last, if differences in preferences within member states are relatively 
great, it may –under strict assumptions- be welfare improving to provide redistribution on 
the central level, as Akai and Mikamie (2006) showed. In the chapter 9, it is considered 
what kind of preferences for social security Europeans have. 
 
Asymmetric information and preference matching remain at the heart of the discussion 
about the optimal decision level for redistribution. Member states may have more 
information about the preferences of their inhabitants. However, with international 
interdependent utility functions, externalities may arise, which provide arguments for a 
European influence. Other relevant factors that may cause externalities are mobile factors 
of production. The consequences of this are discussed in the next chapter.
                                                 
17 Indeed, because maximizing total utility in Europe is the chosen normative approach. 
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5. Mobility of factors of production 
 
The mobility of production factors is a crucial issue when the optimal decision level for 
redistribution is analysed. Indeed, if people and capital are immobile, tax competition 
and a race to the bottom will not occur. In such a case, the argument for providing 
redistribution at a central level to prevent social policy competition becomes irrelevant. 
Several authors have argued that, even if factors of production are mobile, decentral 
governments can reach an optimal provision level of redistribution. 
In this chapter the effects that capital and labour mobility can have on the optimal 
decision level for redistribution are discussed. First, the mobility of labour is considered. 
Will conclusions change when only the rich or the poor are mobile?   
Subsequently, the mobility of capital is analysed. Then, based on chapters 3, 4 and 5 a 
table is provided which shows the traditional fiscal federalism arguments for and against 
(de)central redistribution. In the next chapter the mobility of labour and capital on social 
security based on insurance functions is analysed. 
 
5.1 Labour mobility 
It was shown that traditional economists as Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) argued 
that redistribution should be provided at the central level. Mobility of labour would 
induce a social race to the bottom. Thereby, mobility comes with a cost (Pauly, 1973). 
Moving from one place to another can create a deadweight loss to society. 
However, other economists stated that –with mobile labourers- redistribution could be 
efficiently provided by decentral governments. Pauly (1973) was the first author who 
made this point. He developed a model in which utility of inhabitants are interdependent. 
In the basic models of Oates, Musgrave and others, it was assumed that people act in their 
own interests. These interests are given by the optimisation of their own welfare. Pauly 
assumes that people optimise their utility as well as the utility of other people. So, utility 
is interdependent. Furthermore, he assumes that people, who live nearby, count heavier in 
the utility functions than people further away.18 So, the utility interdependence decreases 
by distance.19 Next to this, the author defines the following assumptions. Rich people 
define a minimum wealth level, which is the same for all the poor. So, poor people do not 
have voting power. Rich people pay a proportional tax to provide this. Further, it is 
assumed that the transfers received do not alter work effort of welfare recipients. Pauly 
investigates what happens in this model when 1) there is no mobility; 2) only taxpayers 
can move and 3) only welfare recipients can move. 
When there is no mobility and there are no spillovers to the rich in a different region of 
the wealth of the poor in another region, the case is easy. Local governments can provide 
the optimal level of redistribution. Assumed that the central government can only provide 
an equal amount of wealth to all the poor (differences in transfers to the poor between 
regions are thus not allowed), it is found that local redistribution is always to be preferred 
                                                 
18 Possibly this is a reasonable assumption for Europe, when it is assumed that people want to pay more for 
the inhabitants of their own country than for people from the other countries of the EU. 
19 Pauly (1973) argues, that this may be because of direct preferences for a more equal (own) society, but 
also because of the reason that poor people who live nearby are sooner involved with criminal activities 
against them. 
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above central redistribution.20 In Pauly’s positive analyses, he concludes (p. 45): “In 
short, there is no theoretical reason to suppose that consolidation will lead to greater 
redistribution”. 
Now, the case is considered, in which the rich get utility of the wealth of the poor in 
another region. However, this is less than the utility they get from the wealth level of the 
poor in their own region. Both groups stay immobile. There are two solutions to get the 
optimal level of income redistribution 1) marginal transfer between local governments or 
2) matching grants paid by the central government. Because one cannot consider the real 
preferences of the rich in the real world, one has to deal with strategic behaviour. The 
efficient outcome is then difficult to achieve. Pauly (1973) shows with his positive 
analysis that voters will prefer lower federal tax rates (compared to local tax rates), which 
leads to a reduction in aggregate redistribution. 
 
Mobile rich 
If it is assumed that taxpayers are mobile and some extra assumptions are included, it can 
be shown that mobile taxpayers lead to inefficient results.21 Inefficient in a sense, that not 
only the poor people are worse off due to lower wealth levels, but also the rich, due to 
negative externalities. Indeed, when people move to the no-tax area, the people who stay 
miss their tax contributions, which are a negative externality that causes inefficiencies. 
Nevertheless, migration can be Pareto-improving. The rich who move have –by 
definition- a higher utility level after migration. Yet, those who stay face either high 
mobility costs or have high preferences for redistribution. It can be the case that the 
preferences for higher redistribution levels outweigh the tax base effect, so that the poor 
benefit from the labour mobility of the rich and a Pareto-optimal result is found. 
Because movement lowers the level of diseconomy, centrally provided redistribution is 
likely to be smaller in this scenario than a locally provided one. However, poor people in 
a region can also lose from locally provided redistribution with mobility of the rich. 
 
Mobile poor 
Now turn to the third case, when only welfare recipients are mobile. Pauly (1973) shows 
that local redistribution generates three kinds of efficiency costs. First, when raising 
redistribution in a region, tax savings by other taxpayers are not taken into account. 
Second, the poor that leave a region make the poor in the previous region better off, while 
decreasing the utility of the poor in the new region. There is no correction mechanism for 
this externality. Third, the costs of moving represents a dead weight loss. It seems that 
central redistribution is more efficient in a mobile poor scenario. 
Pauly (1973) concludes that the view of the traditional economists is too simple. When a 
spatial dimension is taken into account with respect to the motivation for redistribution, 
local governments are serious institutions that can provide redistribution. 
 
                                                 
20 Only, when the rich in every region exactly want the same wealth level of all the poor, the central 
provision of redistribution generates the same outcome as local redistribution. 
21 The main extra assumption is that the regions differ in their attractiveness. In the attractive region, there 
live poor (Pauly calls this the city centre), while there are no poor people in the other, less attractive, 
region. 
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Brown and Oates (1987) go further with the analysis of Pauly (1973). They start with the 
remark that if redistribution is not based on central altruism, mobility of the poor leads to 
a role for the central authority. This is where Pauly (1973) ended. 
Brown and Oates (1987) analyse which government level should provide redistribution. 
The main difference with Pauly’s model is that they assume homogeneous agents in a 
jurisdiction. So, it is assumed that everyone has the same preferences as the median voter, 
while in the Pauly (1973) model everyone has different utility functions. Furthermore 
they investigate the case in which the poor are mobile, while the rich do not react to tax 
differences (and are thus immobile).22 As may be expected, a greater elasticity of 
migration, leaves the poor ceteris paribus with lower benefits. However, if the number of 
poor and migration pattern can change, the effect of a local redistributive policy may not 
be the same. In a general equilibrium analysis the authors show that the result for the “net 
immigration” region is ambiguous. An increase in migration elasticity has a decreasing 
effect on benefit levels, but a decrease in the amount of poor people makes it cheaper for 
the rich to increase the wealth level of the poor. However, a “typical” result is a lower 
average payment to the poor in the whole country.23 This payment is –from a national 
perspective- probably too low, because only the utility of the non-poor are considered. A 
second normative argument that Brown and Oates (1987) put to the floor is that the 
differences between poor people and regions should not be too big. According to them, 
redistribution is a national public good. They end with the conclusion that with mobility 
of the poor, there are strong arguments for central government intervention.24 
 
Excessive redistribution 
As Pauly (1973), Leite-Monteiro (1997) developed a model with altruistic voters. Again, 
there are two countries, which differ in their populations, with two types of individuals. 
However, the rich only care about the poor who originally lived in their country. 
Migration comes with a differentiated cost between persons.25 Leite-Monteiro compares 
the mobility-case with the case, when mobility comes with prohibitive high costs. The 
author shows that with mobility the result may be less, more or the same amount of 
redistribution. When the countries are symmetric, no migration occurs, but a decline in 
redistribution results due to the pressure from migration and a declining tax base. The 
race to the bottom argument is valid (to a certain extent).  
When an asymmetric equilibrium with emigration of the rich is considered, this results in 
less (or incomplete) redistribution also. However, if immigration of the rich and the poor 
is assumed, the level of redistribution may be the same or even more than in the no-
mobility case. This is shown in figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 In a footnote Brown and Oates (1987) claim that this is a reasonable assumption, when you look at the 
empirical evidence for the United States. 
23 Although the authors did not succeed in formalising this claim. 
24 Another “solution” could be to forbid the poor to migrate. 
25 Indeed, when the cost of migration for everyone is the same, a corner solution results in which everyone 
migrates or everyone stays. 
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   Figure 2: Autarkic utility possibility frontiers 
 
              Source: Leite-Monteiro (1997) 
 
In figure 2, the utility of the rich is given on the vertical axis and the utility of the poor, 
type 1 persons, on the horizontal axis. The figure shows the case, where country A has 
relative more poor people than country B. So, the production possibility frontier of 
country A (AA’) lies within that of the frontier of country B (BB’) for TB1<0.26 When the 
taxes in country B on the rich people are greater than zero, they have more possibilities. 
Without mobility, the level of redistribution is given by the relative composition of the 
country: TAa in country A and TBa in country B. In this example, it is shown that low and 
high-income individuals will migrate from country A to country B. Leite-Monteiro 
assumes that the rich type 2 persons, are more mobile.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Indeed, TB1<0 holds when tax rates and redistribution levels in country B are positive. 
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Figure 3: The utility possibility frontiers with immigration 
 
           Source: Leite-Monteiro (1997) 
 
Figure 3 shows what occurs when people migrate from country A to B. With a myopic 
government frontier CC’ results: government B sets its taxes and redistribution level 
without taking the increased tax base into account. With a rational government B, frontier 
DD’ results. Both show an excessive level of redistribution, with TB* and TBM as 
equilibrium respectively. Indeed, the cost of reducing the tax on rich people increases 
(due to immigration, the tax base increased), while the opposite holds for people with 
lower incomes. Leite-Monteiro shows that when countries differ in their population 
structure and high income people are more mobile, excessive redistribution may result 
when redistribution is managed on a decentral level. 
 
Kinds of competition 
In another article, where the rich and the poor are mobile, it is argued that the 
redistributive outcome depends on the kind of competition between the governments 
(Hindriks, 1999). With transfer competition, a race to the bottom occurs. However, when 
there is strategic tax competition this is not the logical result. Hindriks (1999) assumes a 
lot of individuals with heterogeneous incomes and preferences for localities.27 The 
number of jurisdictions is fixed.  
Three strategic games are analysed: 1) a tax competition game, with tax rates as strategic 
variables and where governments anticipate on the expected migration flows; 2) a 
transfer competition game, with transfers as strategic variable and anticipating on the 
                                                 
27 Indeed, a heterogeneous preference for a jurisdiction can analytically also be seen as people who differ in 
their mobility costs. 
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resulting division of the population and tax rates needed; 3) a tax-transfer competition 
game, where tax and transfers are strategies. 
First, consider the tax competition game where it is shown that redistribution is higher, 
when people have a greater preference for redistribution and / or when the dependency 
ratio is lower. Furthermore, mobile rich reduce tax rates (and redistribution levels). A 
higher mobility of the poor, however, can increase the tax levels when the rich’ 
preferences for redistribution are relatively great. The mobility of the poor can counter-
balance the rich mobility to end with redistribution loving high incomes, who deliver 
relatively higher redistribution levels. 
In the second example, policymakers do not take the tax rate of the other jurisdictions as 
given (as was the case in the first example). If it is assumed that corner solutions do not 
occur, the traditional race to the bottom is the result. When policymakers raise their 
transfer levels, they expect lower tax levels set by other jurisdictions, while the opposite 
holds in the former case. 
The third option, tax-transfer competition, has results in between tax- and transfer-
competition. Redistribution declines, but to a moderate extent. Furthermore, mobile poor 
always decrease redistribution levels. 
Hindriks (1999) concludes that mobility of the rich declines tax rates and transfers under 
all circumstances, but mobility of the poor can result in higher redistribution levels. 
When the rich have a strong preference for redistribution and governments react 
“friendly” on each other, the benefit of taxation is high. So, a reduction in the tax rate 
(due to mobile poor) can be outweighed by the benefit the poor can get from migration. 
 
Pelkmans (2006) states that due to low labour mobility in the EU, the income tax is 
essentially immobile. So, income redistribution based on this tax base can be provided 
efficiently in a decentral way. However, when mobility increases there may be a case for 
European involvement.  
 
5.2 Capital mobility 
Labour mobility is not the only relevant factor for the optimal provision of redistribution. 
Capital mobility can also prevent regions to provide redistributive social security. Indeed, 
when capital is taxed to provide redistribution, the effects of mobile capital should be 
taken into account. In this section, some models that theoretically explain the expected 
effects of mobile capital markets on redistribution levels are analysed. 
 
The traditional view on mobile capital is that capital owners will seek the lowest tax 
rates, such that the rents can be as high as possible. When taxes on capital are raised to 
provide (horizontal or vertical) redistribution, policy competition may induce a race to 
the bottom, which may be inefficient. 
 
Race to the top 
However, a race to the top with mobile capital is also a possibility. Lejour and Verbon 
(1997) develop an endogenous growth model with tax competition. They show that an 
inefficient high level of redistribution can result, when decisions are taken at the local 
level. This is the case when the traditional externality (the tax base) is outweighed by the 
growth externality in their model.  
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The authors assume two groups in two countries: capitalists and workers. Capitalists are 
taxed to redistribute to the workers. Capitalists invest at home and abroad. Higher tax 
levels reduce the return on capital. So, this has consequences for the amount of 
investments in a country. A decline in foreign investments due to higher redistribution 
levels at home is not taken into account. People do not pay the full prices of higher 
redistribution levels in their home country. An inefficient high level of redistribution can 
be the consequence. This is the case, when the future is considered important (the rate of 
time preference is low) and / or when the investments abroad are relatively big. Indeed, a 
lower rate of time preferences weighs future wealth (and thus growth) heavier, which 
raises the growth externality. The same holds for more investments abroad. Of course, 
when there are no investments the growth externality is not present. With co-ordination 
these effects are taken into account and the optimal level of redistribution (with higher 
growth rates) results. 
The authors point out the importance of economic growth in redistribution debates. 
However, they only consider a model with identical countries that face the same growth 
rate in equilibrium, which may not be a good estimate for Europe’s diversity. 
 
Pemberton (1999) comes to a similar conclusion as Lejour and Verbon (1997): a local 
provision may lead to an inefficient high level of redistribution. Pemberton states that, 
when all decentral governments assume that the world interest rate is given, the 
externality on interest rates from higher levels of redistribution is not taken into account. 
When denying the consequences of higher redistribution levels on savings rates 
inefficient high levels of redistribution will be the result. In the simple model, with two-
period living individuals, without uncertainty, with perfect capital markets and without 
intergenerational redistribution, the author shows with his calibrations that there are 
substantial Pareto-efficient gains from international policy co-ordination. However, the 
author only looks at steady state equilibriums and leaves transitional dynamics for future 
research.28 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
When the effects of labour mobility on the optimal decision level for social security are 
analysed, different relevant variables can be distinguished. First, the reason to provide 
redistribution is important. It was shown that when the rich are altruistic and utility levels 
are interdependent decentral redistribution can be optimal under some assumptions 
(Pauly, 1973). Furthermore it is important to whom people are altruistic. As Brown and 
Oates (1983) show, when people are altruistic to people in a whole nation central 
provision of redistribution may be optimal. However, when inhabitants have more 
altruistic feelings for persons nearby, a decentral provision may be optimal.  
The costs and dead weight losses that are related to migration must also be considered 
(Pauly, 1973). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Although -as is well known- during transitions the consequences of restructuring economic systems may 
be substantial. 
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Another important issue is which groups are mobile. In Pauly’s model mobile poor lead 
to lower redistribution levels, while with mobile rich higher levels result. In the Leite-
Monteiro (1997) model it was shown that with mobility of only the rich or only the poor 
redistribution declines. But when both groups are mobile and countries have different 
population structures redistribution may even be excessively high.  
Hindriks (1999) concludes that mobile poor may increase redistribution levels, while 
mobile rich reduces them. It is important to consider the mechanisms in all these articles 
to determine which effects are based on which assumptions, because the mobility of 
different groups can have different effects on redistribution levels. 
 
With respect to capital mobility it may be concluded that in contrast with the standard 
policy competition outcome, in some models capital mobility may lead to inefficient high 
redistribution levels when this is provided at the decentral level. This is counterintuitive, 
because a tax competition effect may be expected. In the models of Lejour and Verbon 
(1997) and Pemberton (1999) a kind of small country assumption is used. Actions taken 
at the decentral level do not lead to actions by the other countries. Then, policy co-
ordination may lead to welfare maximisation, which in these cases implies lower levels of 
redistribution.29 
 
After having discussed the traditional fiscal federalism approach with respect to the 
“redistribution branch” it is possible to present table 2, which provides an impression 
under which circumstances a (de)central provision of redistribution is welfare enhancing 
and what can be the driving determinants. In chapters 3, 4 and 5 the relevant factors and 
determinants were discussed. The traditional arguments for central policy provision (the 
existence of economies of scales and / or cross border externalities) are reasons to 
provide redistribution at the central level. Preference matching and learning effects are 
arguments for a decentral provision of redistribution. The determinants that make a 
decentral provision more efficient due to preferences matching are the existence of 
asymmetric information, the uniformity condition for the central government, differences 
in preferences and local altruism.  
In this chapter the cross-border externalities related to factor mobility were investigated 
more closely. In table 2, the standard tax and policy competition results are reflected as 
an argument for centralisation. However, also when a race to the top can occur, this 
provides arguments to centralise to reduce the negative externalities. Therefore, mobile 
labour and –when redistribution is financed by raising tax on capital- mobile capital 
should be weighted as an argument for centralisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 And as was shown: despite lower redistribution levels, co-ordination may even lead to Pareto-
improvements (Pemberton, 1999). 
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Table 2: Attributing redistribution: The traditional approach 
 
Approach  Central Determinants  Decentral Determinants 
Traditional  economies of 
scale 
same preferences for 
redistribution in EU 
and “EU-altruism” 
 preference 
matching 
asymmetric information; 
uniformity condition; 
differences in 
preferences;  local 
altruism 
  cross-border 
externalities 
uniformity at central 
level 
 learning effects innovative new policies 
Labour mobility       
race to the bottom  tax competition especially mobile 
rich; dead weight 
loss mobility; 
redistribution 
European concern 
   
Capital mobility       
race to the bottom  tax competition     
race to the top   growth externalities 
not taken into 
account 
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6. Insurance 
The traditional approach, which was considered in the chapters before, pays attention to 
the “redistribution branch”. In this paper the fiscal federalism framework is extended 
with the other function that social security has: insurance. In this chapter factors are 
analysed that are especially important with respect to insurance based on income 
solidarity, risk solidarity or solidarity of chance. Then, a table is provided with the main 
arguments and determinants for and against (de)centralisation of insurance-based social 
security functions. 
 
6.1 Efficient risk pool 
When considering if (de)centralisation is welfare improving with respect to insurance, the 
question is which risk pool is efficient and under what circumstances. Hindriks and 
Myles (2004) define four prerequisites for an efficient risk pool. 
First, the broader the base, the more efficient risk pooling becomes. A broader risk pool 
may induce economies of scale. If the number of participants increases -ceteris paribus- 
risks can be shared with more people, which enhances efficiency. However, there are 
some prerequisites for broader risk pools to be efficient.  
First, there must be some degree of negative risk correlation between participants. If a 
certain event occurs and everyone faces exactly the same consequences, it is not possible 
to insure people against an event. This could be an issue when a world disaster occurs. 
However, with respect to social security based on insurance there are always people who 
face a certain event and those who do not. Then another argument comes to the floor. 
With respect to some kind of insurances private provision might be more efficient (De 
Mooij, 2006).30 However, when correlations between insured people are too big, 
companies may have problems to pay the promised benefits. Indeed, bankruptcies may 
arise. An alternative may be that inefficient high savings rates and reserves are needed. 
An example of an insurance which is characterised by this problem is unemployment 
insurance. During economic downturns a lot of people draw benefits and this may lead to 
financial problems and / or inefficient high premiums to prevent that this occurs. Private 
alternatives for unemployment insurances are therefore usually qualified as inefficient 
(De Mooij, 2006).31  
Third, there must be some symmetry between participants. Otherwise, some people may 
always have to pay for other people and the system becomes unsustainable. Indeed, in 
this case redistribution is investigated instead of insurance. Finally, the amount of 
reciprocity is important. Participants must believe that everyone does what is promised. 
Contracts have to be enforceable.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Private provision is especially interesting with respect to actuarial fair insurances, as will be argued later. 
31 Another motivation for the government to provide social insurances is intergenerational redistribution 
and intergenerational risk sharing (De Mooij, 2006). Section 6.2 pays attention to these elements, when the 
implicit pension contracts are analysed. 
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It follows from the third prerequisite that when the European Union considers many 
asymmetric shocks to the same regions, a central provision of insurance may not be 
optimal. Indeed, this results in implicit transfers from low- to high-risk regions. This is 
related to the vision of Krugman and Venables (1996). They state that further (European) 
economic integration can lead to more specialisation. This implies that sector specific 
shocks will hurt only those regions that are abundant in those sectors. When shocks are 
related, e.g. agriculture get shocks while services is not hurt, the risk pool may be more 
efficient on the national level. 
The European Commission has the opposite vision (Eiffinger and De Haan, 2000). The 
Commission states that further economic integration will lead to more trade between 
regions and strengthened interrelations between nations. Economies will converge to 
each other with respect to economic development as well as with respect to their sector 
structures. This analysis consequently leads to the conclusion that the risk pool is 
relatively more efficient at the level of the EU. 
 
Adverse selection and moral hazard 
Especially in Europe insurance risks may be different between the member states of the 
EU. Poland has far more unemployed than e.g. the Netherlands. This is also related to the 
Krugman versus European Commission view of the way economic shocks will happen. 
When specialisation tendencies are expected, adverse selection seems to be more 
important than when intraregional trade evolves. However, it may be expected that 
European insurance mechanisms may lead to a greater pressure for adverse selection.  
In the end, when low risk countries (or people) do not want insurance and high risk 
people want, premiums will rise. Adverse selection may lead to ever increasing premiums 
that become so high that nobody can get insurance anymore. Then, the standard Akerlof 
(1970) equilibrium results. This can be reduced by rules that oblige everyone to take the 
same (centrally provided) insurance. 
A less extreme outcome may be a separating equilibrium, in which people who face high 
risks and people who face low risks have their own insurance (Tirole, 1988). Then, the 
low risk people are asking for lower insurance levels (with lower premiums) than the 
high risk people. Of course, this reduces the amount of risk (or income) solidarity of 
social insurances. Again, obligated insurances can solve this problem. 
With respect to social insurance based on solidarity of chance the adverse selection 
problem is not relevant. Indeed, people pay an actuarial fair premium and do not have an 
incentive to separate from “costly” fellow-insured people.32 An example of this kind of 
insurance is pensions based on defined contributions (Bovenberg, 2003).33 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Indeed, people may have different preferences for the amount of insurance. However, this only leads to 
different amounts of insurances, but does not change the contribution-benefit rate. 
33 However, it must be kept in mind that “real” actuarial fair insurances are difficult to find. No-
discrimination rules may e.g. prevent insurance companies from asking actuarial fair premiums for e.g. 
women (who have higher life expectancies). The same discussion holds for people from different member 
states and healthy (or sick) people with differences in expected life times. 
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Moral hazard can occur if people have insurance. People change their behaviour, because 
they do not feel the pain of their decisions when a certain event occurs. It can be argued 
that governments that are “closer” to the insured people can monitor their behaviour 
better. This may be a reason to decentralise insurance mechanisms.34 Other measures that 
might reduce moral hazard are sanctions, the introduction of no claim premiums and / or 
a part of own risks with respect to demanding insurance benefits. Moral hazard is 
relevant for all kind of insurances. However, with respect to moral hazard –again- the 
question may be raised how relevant this is for (all kinds of) pensions. It could be hardly 
imagined that people’s behaviour is morally unjust, because they stay alive.  
 
6.2 Pensions and mobility 
An example of social insurance mechanisms that are based on insurance elements are 
(funded) pensions. People pay contributions during their life and receive benefits till they 
die. Pensions that are partially based on insurance mechanisms and partially on 
redistribution can be Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) systems. E.g. in the Netherlands people 
pay income related taxes and all receive the same benefits per year when they receive a 
certain age.35 
 
Adema et al. (2006) investigate the influence of ageing on the externalities that are 
related to the different pension systems. The authors show that countries with a funded 
pension system exhibit negative spillovers from countries that have PAYG systems in the 
long run. However, in the short run these effects are in the opposite direction. It is 
assumed that there is an integrated capital market with countries that have different 
pension systems. The same ageing shock occurs in all countries.36 Adema et al. (2006) 
show that, in response to the shock, savings in the funded pension country increase more 
than in the PAYG-country, so in the long run the PAYG-country benefits from the 
integrated capital market. On the other hand, in the short run the effects are the other way 
around. This is due to the relatively smaller rise of the lower capital-labour ratio in the 
funded country compared with the PAYG-country. So, the harmful rise in the interest rate 
is smaller for the generation that is born in the funded country at the time the shock 
occurs. These results of Adema et al. (2006) are counterintuitive, because it is usually 
argued that countries with funded schemes are less vulnerable to ageing shocks. 
However, in an integrated capital market with countries having different pension systems, 
countries with funded systems may be more vulnerable to an ageing shock in the long 
run. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This is e.g. one reason for the decentralisation of the social assistance (the “Wet Werk en Bijstand”) from 
the central to the local governments in the Netherlands in 2005. 
35 However, this depends on the country specific PAYG-systems. In “Bismarckian” Germany e.g. people 
get (PAYG) pension benefits that are related to the amount of contributions paid during their life, while in 
the Netherlands benefits are not related to the amount of contributions paid (although they are related to the 
duration of living in the country). 
36 Adema et al. (2006) consider two shocks: an increase in longevity and lower fertility rates. Here only the 
increase in longevity is considered. With lower fertility rates, the effects for funded pension countries 
change for realistic estimates of the relevant variables. 
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Implicit pension contracts 
Breyer and Kolmar (2002) analyse what happens with unfunded (PAYG) pension 
systems if labour is imperfectly mobile. The authors assume that the “place of residence 
principle” holds: people get the PAYG-pension from the state, where they live. When 
there is complete mobility of labour, they show that all PAYG-pensions and contributions 
must be the same. However, when labour is partly mobile this is not the result. Then, 
some central harmonisation is welfare improving. Even a “nationality principle” (instead 
of a place of residence principle) may not prevent the raised problems. Indeed, migration 
will not occur anymore, because there are no gains from moving to another country. 
However, now whole generations can choose to take the same nationality, leaving 
another generation without PAYG-benefits.37 If this will occur depends on the mobility 
structure and the fertility rates. Indeed, when fertility rates decline, less people have to 
pay for the (bigger group of) elderly and therefore have an incentive to choose another 
nationality. In that case, the implicit generations’ contract of the PAYG-system is not 
stable anymore. A complete centralisation of pensions to a European level is then welfare 
improving. 
 
Uebelmesser (2003) investigates the implicit contract between generations of a PAYG 
pension system. The author states that these contracts combined with the equal treatment 
rules of the EU may result in inefficient migration. After the start of a PAYG pension 
system some age cohorts receive benefits of the system, while they did not contribute. 
These benefits must be financed by the younger generations. Their contributions are 
higher than their benefits from the PAYG-system. The difference between the net present 
value of the benefits and contributions is the implicit tax generations have to pay. The 
difference in this tax between countries is a driver for younger generations to move to 
other countries. This mobility strengthens the negative effect, because implicit taxes will 
rise for people who stay in the emigration country. Because of this inefficient mobility 
the EU should intervene. Uebelmesser (2003) considers three scenarios (harmonisation, 
interjurisdictional transfers and delayed integration) in which European intervention –to 
different extents- is welfare improving.38 Harmonisation of contribution rates in Europe 
takes away the inefficient migration, but has the usual negative consequences (no free 
choice of pension system in countries, no reaction on specific circumstances of countries, 
et cetera).  
With perfect information, the central government can provide interjurisdictional transfers 
to local governments and reach the efficient outcome (Wildasin, 1991). 
The third option is taking the home-country principle for social security. This implies that 
people belong to a pension system for their whole life. Even when they migrate, they 
have to pay (and get benefits) from their initial pension system. Inefficient migration does 
not occur anymore. However, political majorities (of e.g. the elderly) may lead to 
inefficient low labour supplies of the young, who have to pay.  
Without a minimum of harmonisation, a race to the bottom will occur. Another, less 
attracting alternative, may be a prohibition of migration. Since one of the main goals of 
                                                 
37 Breyer and Kolmar (2002) assume that people can choose their nationality once during their life and that 
they are not able to change this later. 
38 An analysis of these “cooperation measures” for social security in general is provided in chapter 8. 
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Europe is a free movement of labour, this is rather unlikely to happen. A certain level of 
harmonisation is necessary according to Uebelmesser (2003).  
 
The effects of mobility on the different pension systems in the EU can be considerable. 
An integrated capital market may lead to positive consequences for countries with a 
relatively funded system in the short run and negative consequences in the long run 
(Adema et al., 2006). Labour mobility has consequences for the implicit contracts 
between generations. When people move to elevate the taxes they should pay, a race to 
the bottom may occur. And with the ageing population these effects are strengthened. 
Therefore, European intervention on this insurance based on income solidarity in Europe 
is needed according to Uebelmesser (2003).  
 
Race to the top 
Lejour and Verbon (1994) develop a model with two groups. One bears a high risk and 
the other group bears a low risk of being unemployed. However, the authors assume that 
both workers are equally productive, when they work. Lejour and Verbon (1994) 
investigate what happens when both groups are (partially) mobile. They show that when 
high-risk workers are relatively mobile and the low risk workers are not, lower social 
insurance levels result. This is the usual outcome. When the mobility of the low-risk 
group is much higher than the mobility of the high-risk group, redistribution is higher 
when a local government provides it than when a central authority does. 
The authors describe the two functions of social security: redistribution and insurance. 
They assume that the low-risk people are not able to divide a risk pool for themselves. 
So, the high-risk people want full insurance, while the low risk ones do not. Policymakers 
set an optimal social security level, taking migration decisions and the impact on real 
wages into account. When high-risk people migrate to the high tax- high social security 
country, a lower degree of redistribution does not necessarily follow from the model. 
Lejour and Verbon (1994) argue that when the risk aversion is relatively high (the 
insurance part of the redistribution is relatively heavy weighted) and / or the congestion 
costs of living together in one country are sufficiently low, a higher redistribution level 
results when it is organised in a decentral way compared to a central provision of social 
insurance. Then, an inefficient race to the top is the result. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Table 3 summarises the arguments for a (de)central provision of social insurance. 
Insurances based on solidarity of chance can provide economies of scale, when an 
efficient risk pool can be formed. If this is the case depends on the broadness of the base, 
the existence of negative risk correlation and some symmetry between participants and if 
reciprocity can be guaranteed. 
The same factors are relevant with respect to risk solidarity. A broader base may increase 
efficiency. However, when industrial specialisation in Europe occurs, this will induce 
asymmetric shocks and may reduce an efficient insurance provision on the central scale. 
Indeed, in the end insurance then becomes redistribution. 
Furthermore, moral hazard can be a risk. This holds for the three described functions of 
insurance. If member states are better able to monitor (and punish) bad behaviour, this 
may be an argument for a decentral provision.  
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Adverse selection is important with respect to insurances based on risk and income 
solidarity.39 Indeed, when ex ante differences between people exist there are incentives 
for high risks to insure themselves against lower costs than actuarial fair insurance 
systems would ask. The same holds for groups of people and countries. Countries that 
have relatively much unemployment may pledge for a European unemployment system, 
while other countries may appose it. To assess whether it is welfare improving to 
attribute these insurances to the (de)central government level, adverse selection 
mechanisms must than be weighted against other relevant factors for redistributive 
elements discussed in previous sections (e.g. preference matching, the amount of 
preferences for European altruism, et cetera). 
A specific event was raised by Lejour and Verbon (1994), who argue that a “race to the 
top” with respect to a decentral provision of insurances based on risk solidarity could 
occur.  
With respect to insurances based on income solidarity, initial institutions are of 
importance, especially with respect to pension systems. Indeed, the European countries 
diverse to a great extent in their pension systems and this may induce negative 
externalities in an integrated capital market. Furthermore, labour mobility can have 
consequences on the implicit contracts between generations. When people move to 
elevate the taxes they should pay, a race to the bottom may occur. So, especially, if 
production factors are mobile, ageing occurs and implicit pension contracts differ 
between countries, the risk of negative externalities is great. In that case a (complete) 
decentral provision of insurances based on income solidarity should not be advocated. 
 
Table 3: Attributing insurance 
 
Approach  Central Determinants  Decentral Determinants 
Solidarity of chance  economies of 
scale 
broad base; negative 
risk correlation; 
some symmetry; 
reciprocity 
   
     moral hazard monitoring 
Risk solidarity  economies of 
scale 
broad base; negative 
risk correlation; 
some symmetry; 
reciprocity; intra-
industrial trade 
 specialisation; 
adverse selection; 
preference 
matching 
 
  race to the top different population 
structures; low risks 
relative mobile 
 moral hazard monitoring 
Income solidarity  race to the 
bottom 
capital mobility; 
ageing; implicit 
pension contracts 
 adverse selection; 
preference 
matching 
 
     moral hazard monitoring 
 
                                                 
39 With actuarial fair insurances (that are based on reciprocity) adverse selection is not a problem, because 
people pay contributions directly related to the expected risks and benefits they face. 
A Social Europe: Political Utopia or Efficient Economics? 
 
44 
7.  Political economy considerations  
 
Up till now governments that maximise the utility of (parts of) their inhabitants were 
considered. There are, however, also governments that are not benevolent and try to 
maximise the profits of some people in office. Furthermore politicians may be corrupt or 
lobby groups may reap benefits from the common pool.  
Thereby, there may be information and delegation problems between politicians and 
people. Therefore it is relevant to look at the specific constitution in which decisions are 
made. Political economy considerations are important for both functions of social 
security. Indeed, inefficiency in (de)central policymaking has consequences for an 
efficient provision of social security for redistribution as well as insurance mechanisms. 
In this chapter, attention is paid to Leviathan governments, lobbying and corruption. 
Also, second-generation theories of fiscal federalism and the specific European 
Constitution are considered. The chapter concludes with a table, where the 
(dis)advantages of a (de)central provision of social security are summarised. 
 
7.1 Leviathan governments 
One of the most famous (static) political models of the government is the Leviathan 
government developed by Niskanen (1968). This author states that bureaucrats try to 
maximise their revenues, instead of the utility of the inhabitants. This results in 
governmental intervention that is two times bigger than in the optimal situation. 
Of course, different assumptions about governmental behaviour lead to different 
conclusions in the discussion about attributing social security policies to different 
government levels. Indeed, when it is assumed that governmental influence is initially 
inefficiently high, tax competition reduces the amount of governmental expenditures, 
which enhances total welfare. Or as the British government stated in the debate about 
European tax co-ordination in 1988, as cited by Edwards and Keen (1996, p.115): “The 
pressure on tax rates would in general be downwards, providing an essential antidote to 
the in-built pressures for increased public expenditures and taxation”. 
Edwards and Keen (1996) try to get the debate about the desirability of central 
cooperation on a higher level.40 They analyse the deeper mechanisms at work when 
comparing the effects on central policy co-ordination within a partially Leviathan and a 
partially benevolent government. Then, as they state, it is not a question of faith in one of 
the governments behaviours, but it can be analysed more specifically under what 
circumstances central policy co-ordination may be welfare enhancing. Therefore they 
build a tax competition model with mobile capital and governments that are neither 
totally benevolent nor totally revenue maximisers. They assume that policymakers act as 
if people have diminishing marginal utilities on the public goods. Central provision of the 
public good elevates the tax externality, because it is assumed that central taxes are lump 
sum and thus not welfare distorting.  There are three effects of centralised taxation:  
1) citizens are worse of, because they have less money to spend on private goods; 
2) a positive effect of more public good provision and 3) a negative relative price effect, 
because the marginal value of public goods diminishes. 
                                                 
40 For the analyses of the articles by Edwards and Keen (1996) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) the paper 
of Voget (2006) is used. 
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The authors show that, with full mobility co-ordination, it is always welfare enhancing if 
the elasticity of the tax on mobile capital exceeds the marginal propensity to waste 
revenues of the policy maker. This implies that when the elasticity is 0.4 it is welfare 
improving to co-ordinate decision making even when governments have additional 
(inefficient) expenditures of 35 per cent. This gives the insight that two effects are 
relevant to determine if centralisation of decision-making is optimal to consider the 
efficiency effects of centralisation, even when it is not exactly known which type of 
government is dealt with. 
 
Furthermore Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) show that when next to horizontal also 
vertical externalities (between levels of government) are considered, cooperation may be 
welfare enhancing, even with Leviathan governments.41 They use the Laffer curve to 
make this point.42 Because both levels of government share their tax base, over taxation 
occurs and there is under saving. When governments are on the “wrong” side of the 
Laffer curve, it is welfare enhancing (for both governments and for consumers) to co-
ordinate policies. This sharply contrasts with the standard theories about Leviathan 
governments.  
 
7.2 Capture, lobbying and corruption 
“Capture” is another form, which diminishes governmental efficiency (Pelkmans, 2006). 
Private companies or groups may lobby for benefits from the central pool. A European 
example is that of the Common Agricultural Policy, where one sector reaps a big part of 
the budget of the European Union.  
Lobbying may be more attractive at the central level, because there are fewer players to 
deal with (Ederveen et al., 2006). Furthermore foreign influences may be bigger, when 
policies are centralised. Foreigners can lobby twice: on the central and on the decentral 
level. Especially when the aims of domestic people and foreigners coincide, this lobby 
may be more powerful. However, when the interests do not coincide, domestic power 
may be allocated to lobby against the foreigners and centralisation may reduce lobby 
power.  
So, it depends on the specific circumstances whether (de)centralisation reduces capture 
(Ederveen et al., 2006). 
 
Corruption 
Next, corruption must be considered. Prud’homme (1994) states that corruption might be 
more important at the local level. First, because there are more opportunities for 
corruption, since there are fewer votes that can contribute to ones re-election. Second, 
because discretion of politicians at the local level is greater than on the national level. 
Furthermore, Prud’homme (1994) states that democratic control of local governments is 
often weaker than on national governments. In the context of Europe, one may 
                                                 
41 The authors assume -in this vertical externality context- that both governments (lower and central) act 
like Leviathans. This contrasts with the usual assumption of one (lower-) level of government that acts like 
a Leviathan, while the other maximises welfare. 
42 The Laffer curve means that there is a tax level that maximises governmental revenues. When taxes are 
“too high” according to this theory, tax bases shrink due to higher taxation and revenues decline. Indeed, 
then lower taxation levels will increase tax income. 
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reasonably assume that it is the other way around: national governments know a tighter 
attention from the media and politicians than the EU. This pushes the point for a more 
decentral provision of social security. However, others state that there is no theoretical 
reason why corruption should be more relevant at the decentral than on the central level. 
Arikan (2004) shows in his empirical analyses of 85 countries that there is a small 
negative relation between fiscal decentralisation and the amount of corruption. This holds 
for less as well as for developed countries. Theoretically, lower levels of governments 
face more competition and therefore leave less room for rent seeking and corruption. 
However, Tanzi (2001) shows that others did not find this effect or even find a positive 
effect between decentralisation and corruption.  
 
7.3 Second-generation theory of fiscal federalism 
In the previous chapters and sections, the relevant factors that determine the optimal 
decision level from the traditional fiscal federalism approach, for insurance functions and 
governmental behaviour were discussed. Now more dynamic political economy factors 
are analysed. Oates (2005) calls these: the second-generation of fiscal federalism models. 
By now, more constitutional variables are endogenised. Attention is paid to political 
majorities that determine social security levels. 
Due to the fact that it is difficult to make a strict distinction between all models that are 
analysed, models are discussed where political economy arguments are in the centre of 
the debate.43 
 
The second-generation theory of fiscal federalism drives on two sources: 1) the focus on 
the political process and behaviour of political agents and 2) the (micro-economic) 
literature about information problems that show that optimal (decision) procedures and 
institutions may vary substantially as a result of imperfect information. The debate in this 
second-generation theory is more about a trade-off between “accountability” at the local 
level (acting according the preferences) and internalisation of externalities.44 
In this section principal-agents problems are a crucial issue, where the central planner 
could be seen as principal and the local governments are seen as the agents. Principal-
agents problems can also exist between (regional) voters and politicians, which can have 
implications for the standard public economic outcomes. The constitutional affairs are, as 
Oates (2005) argues, more endogenous and “self-enforcing” in these new models, while 
the first-generation models are more static in nature. In this context, attention is paid to 
the export of market distortions, endogenously determined separation and the voting 
paradox. Europe’s constitutional design is analysed in section 7.4. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Indeed, when discussing the effects of the mobility of factors of production, the uniformity condition, 
matching grants et cetera, it was investigated what happened when political majorities changed also (e.g. in 
Lejour and Verbon, 1994 and Leite-Monteiro, 1997). However, it is tried to distinguish the main issues 
raised in the articles and group them in different chapters and section. As is stated, in this section the focus 
is especially on the dynamic political economy considerations. However, migrations, the uniformity 
condition, matching grants, et cetera also play a role in these models. 
44 As was shown in the chapters before the traditional trade-off was between the advantages of decentral 
preferences matching and the advantages of central economies of scale and the possibility to internalise 
externalities. 
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Export of market distortions 
Perotti (2001) developed a Cobb-Douglas model with which one could see what the 
consequences are of a federal redistribution policy with factor mobility. The author 
investigates a normative model, in which a central provision of redistribution is 
exogenously determined, and a positive model in which majority voters decide about the 
government decision level of redistribution. Perotti (2001) examined the distributive and 
efficiency effects under both approaches. The author considers the traditional efficiency-
equity trade-off.45 This is captured by two effects of redistribution on efficiency: the 
distortion in the allocation of the production factors by inefficient migration and the 
degree of union power. Perotti (2001) considers a two-country model, where one country 
(B) has a perfect competitive labour market and the other country (A) has a monopoly 
union. Furthermore, to focus on the traditional trade-off it is assumed that preferences for 
redistribution between countries are the same, there is no uncertainty and no moral 
hazard. 
 
The author starts with the normative analysis. He assumes that there are three classes of 
agents in each country (which all have a mass of less than a half, while the total 
population in a country is equal to unity): 1) the labour force, which can supply a unit of 
labour; 2) the capitalists, each endowed with a unit of capital and 3) pensioners, which 
rely totally on redistribution. Capitalists pay a proportional tax rate to finance the 
unemployment benefits and pensions, which are, for simplicity, the same. The fiscal 
policy (the amount of taxes and redistribution) is determined by majority voting.46 
Now, Perotti (2001) considers what happens under different institutional configurations. 
The author starts with the case of decentral decision-making and immobile labour and 
capital. Of course, the competitive labour market knows no unemployment and therefore, 
voters choose for zero tax rates and minimal levels of redistribution.47 In the union-
country maximum tax rates are chosen and unemployment results. Consider now the 
centralised case. The tax base is roughly doubled, while the revenues are divided by 
relatively few persons (indeed, there are only unemployed in the country with a union). 
Pensioners and workers in the union country will always vote for taxes and redistribution, 
while all capitalists and workers in the competitive country will vote against it. If the 
mass of pensioners is relatively big the maximum tax rates result, while the opposite 
occurs when the mass of capitalists is relatively big. In the first case, total output in the 
union country is lower. 
Now, suppose also mobile capital. Usually, it is assumed that this is efficiency-
enhancing. However, it will be shown that voters’ preferences can change and the 
expected gains are not always realised.  
There are two effects of mobile capital on taxation in country A: 1) a direct effect, a flow 
of capital from A to B till the marginal returns on capital are equal; 2) an indirect effect, 
due to redistribution there are less workers in country A and this decreases the amount of 
                                                 
45 Note that this model is different from other models (e.g. Pauly, 1973) in the sense that redistribution does 
not come from altruism and that negative participation effects of redistribution are an important element of 
the model. 
46 The authors assume that redistribution comes with convex costs, so that totally reaping the capitalists is 
not optimal for the other groups. 
47 As was shown, altruism does not play a role in these models. 
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capital in A. Of course, the direct effect is only present in a decentralised regime, where 
tax rates can differ. 
 
Voters in country A vote for zero taxes in a decentralised regime, because of the two 
effects, so redistribution does not occur in both countries. In a centralised regime, only 
the indirect effect prevails. This lowers the cost for inhabitants of country A. They vote 
for maximum tax rates. Workers in country B do the same: indeed the indirect effect 
increases their wages, so a maximum tax rate and lower efficiency results.  
With only labour mobility, the power of the union can even increase. Indeed workers in 
A can choose between the originally high wage in country B or a subsidy. Again the 
preferences of the B-workers are changed in the direction to more taxation. In a 
decentralised system, workers from A drive down wages in B till they are equal to their 
unemployment benefit. Now, workers in B maximise their utility by voting for higher 
redistribution levels. Indeed, although they have a competitive labour market, 
unemployment can be introduced in country B!48 Approximately the same reasoning 
holds for a centralised provision of social security. 
With complete factor mobility a fully efficient allocation of factors results. Indeed tax 
competition under decentralisation results and the tax rates are zero. With a central 
government wages must be the same in both countries. A’s unemployed go to B and take 
the initial capital of country A with them. Therefore all workers vote against 
redistribution. 
 
Table 4: Institutional configurations and efficiency49 
 
     Source: Perotti (2001) 
 
These results are summarised in table 4. There is chosen for an alpha of 0.3 for the Cobb-
Douglas production function and the labour force and capital are normalised to one in 
each country. So, the efficient production level in each country is 1. As can be seen, 
centralisation ceteris paribus reduces efficiency when only capital is mobile.50 Second, 
when only one production factor is liberalised and becomes mobile in a centralised 
system, a less efficient outcome may result compared to the case when both factors are 
immobile.  
                                                 
48 This is the case, when the employment subsidy must be sufficiently small for B’s workers (and thus the 
return on labour and / or the percentage of pensioners must be sufficiently small) 
49  Where in the rows: C is C(entralised) and D is D(ecentralised). The first capital in the columns is 
M(obile) or I((mmobile) capital and the second capital is M(obile) or I(mmobile) labour. 
50 And also when both factors are immobile and the number of pensioners is greater than the number of 
capitalists, which is circumstance “(1)” in table 4. 
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It should be remembered that factor mobility and the choice for a central or decentral 
constitution was exogenously given till so far, whereas, especially in the long run, this is 
often endogenously determined.51 Perotti (2001) therefore takes a positive approach 
where the inhabitants of both countries vote at the same time for three regimes: the 
federal system and the mobility of both production factors. To induce factor mobility it is 
required that both countries agree on that. Thereafter, they vote for the tax rate. Perotti 
(2001) shows that from the decentralised systems only the one with immobile production 
factors has a Nash equilibrium. Centralised systems should provide an improvement for 
majorities in both countries to sustain. It is shown, that depending on the share labour in 
the economy and the number of pensioners, indeed a centralised state with immobile 
labour and mobile capital may outperform the decentral equilibrium.52 So, Perotti 
concludes that also with endogenous voting an inefficient equilibrium with no complete 
factor mobility can be the result.  
The author concludes that these results are relevant for the EU. Labour markets are 
diverse and there is asymmetry between the mobility of capital and labour in the EU. 
Perotti (2001) warns for the dangers of a common social policy, when labour markets are 
not mobile and / or the rents in labour markets decrease. Furthermore, the author remarks 
that elimination of these (union) rents is important, because –contrary to common 
believes- people in countries without distortions may also support inefficient policy 
outcomes. 
 
Separation 
As early as in 1965 Tartlon demonstrated that not only heterogeneity is relevant to 
maintain a federation. A certain amount of homogeneity is also necessary. Regions must 
look like each other on different aspects: size, population, preferences, culture, et cetera 
otherwise problems within a federation will occur. Tartlon (1965) calls this that there 
must be certain “symmetry” between regions to have a well-functioning federal system. 
 
Bolton and Roland (1996) consider the integration or separation of countries, which was 
done among others in the famous Alesina et al. (1995 and 2005) articles. They develop a 
two-country voting model with individuals who may have different preferences for the 
composition and the quantity of public goods. Furthermore, the income distribution 
between the countries can differ, while taxes are linear in both regions. The reason why 
countries separate is to act in accordance with their inhabitants’ interests, which is the 
standard Tiebout (1956) argument. The reason, why countries integrate is the elimination 
of fiscal competition and / or scale effects in production.53 When there is no mobility the 
authors show that different preferences between countries for the amount of public goods 
result in relative high costs of a central provision of public goods. Bolton and Roland 
(1996, p. 101) call the example of the United Kingdom, where European integration is 
seen as “socialism through the backdoor”, and Scandinavian countries where integration 
                                                 
51 In that case the decisive workers in B would often oppose against inefficient results, except from the case 
with centralised redistribution and mobile capital (1.10 dominates 1). Then, B’s workers can profit from the 
capital that flows from A to B, while A’s workers still prefer a centralised redistribution. 
52 With a relatively large share of labour returns and relatively few pensioners this equilibrium results. 
53 For the research question in this thesis,  the economies of scale argument seems reasonable for the 
insurance role of social security, while it is less relevant for the redistribution part. 
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is seen as a “threat to the welfare state”. So, the economies of scale must be very high 
without mobility to centralise policies. 
With complete mobility and different preferences between jurisdictions the reverse 
Tiebout result is relevant: although preferences diverge, every jurisdiction provides the 
same composition and amount of public goods.54 Because equal tax rates result, there are 
no heterogeneity gains anymore from a local provision of public goods. So, very small 
efficiency gains and / or gains from lessening tax competition are enough for political 
support for centralisation.  
Now, Bolton and Roland (1996) consider differences in preferences over the composition 
of public goods in the no-mobility case. They assume that there are two public goods, e.g. 
infrastructure and care and that some people only get utility from infrastructure and some 
people only derive utility from care. The authors show that the bigger the minority (that 
does not derive utility from a good) in a country, the lower the tax rates. 
When perfect mobility is introduced, a perfect sorting equilibrium exists. Now, mobility 
leads to higher tax rates, because people are distinguished for their preference for a type 
of good. The Tiebout theorem holds. In this case, political integration will always be 
rejected even when there can be substantial economies of scale. This is because a 
majority will choose to produce only one good. So, the minority of the inhabitants of the 
integrated country cannot derive any benefit and therefore votes against a central 
provision. The authors state that the critics of Oates’ (1972) assumption that the central 
government only provides homogeneous public goods can see that in their model this is 
the result. Even without the assumption of homogeneous public good provision, this 
happens in equilibrium. Only local governments can accommodate heterogeneous 
preferences. Indeed, this strengthens the conclusion drawn in chapter 4 that the 
uniformity condition is not that important to determine the optimal decision level for 
social security. 
 
Voting paradox 
Bös (1979) developed a political economy model with differences in income levels 
between regions. He shows that a voting paradox can exist: redistribution does not occur 
when local voters decide, while it does when it is decided on a central level. The driving 
force in this model is a shift in majorities voting for a public good. When people have to 
pay a poll tax, the income distribution in a region or a country becomes relevant. Then, 
majority decisions depend on the ratio of median and mean income.55 The median 
income is relevant for the majority vote, while the mean determines the quantity of the 
public good (and indirect the level of redistribution).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 This result holds only, when people have different income levels. In the case where all people earn the 
same and there are differences in preferences we get a high tax - high public goods equilibrium and a low 
tax - low public goods separating equilibrium results. 
55 The author assumes that there are relatively more poor people and relatively less rich, so the income 
distribution is skewed to the left. This seems an assumption in accordance with what can be seen in reality. 
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7.4 Europe’s constitutional design 
Decision procedures are important when considering policy outcomes. The public 
economic debate of the federal system of the United States cannot be discussed in the 
same way as the confederal system of the European Union (Cremer and Pestieau, 2004), 
see box 2. Where the Unites States can try to maximise welfare, the European Union is 
better described as a system where only Pareto-improvements can be made. Otherwise 
countries can veto decisions. Negotiation, cooperation and Pareto-improvements deserve 
extra attention when the optimal decision level for social security is discussed in the 
European context.  
 
Box 2: Is the European Union a federation? 
There are four critical differences between a federation and the European Union 
(Pelkmans, 2006). First the logic in the EU of striving to economic integration is very 
different from the usual debates in a federation about the optimal level of (economic) 
decentralisation. In a federation there is some degree of centrality, while Europe does not 
have that basic starting point. Together with veto power for countries with respect to 
changing treaties (political) costs of centralisation are much higher in Europe than in 
federations. 
Second, the EU does not have the internal market that characterises a federation.56 
Therefore “political spillovers” between policy areas are far less available.57 Thereby, 
where following European laws the free movement of workers is relevant. But de jure is 
not de facto. Indeed, current mobility practice and costs within the EU differ from a 
federation, where movements of persons are de jure free (Pelkmans, 2006).  
Thirdly, the EU has no right to tax, no common army and foreign policy and some 
countries do not have the same currency. While there are –following economic 
federalism- reasons to a degree of centralisation. Moreover, Persson et al. (1996) state 
that with respect to redistribution and risk sharing on the European level legitimacy for a 
central policy is lacking. And according to Bureau and Chamsaur (1992) a persistent 
difference between a federation and the EU is the reluctance of countries to divide power 
to the EU. The stability function e.g. is constrained by forbidding the EU to borrow. 58 
The fourth characteristic where the EU differs from federations is that the EU has no 
central government. So, the EU can not be categorised as a federation.  
 
 
Three kinds of federalism 
Inman and Rubinfield (1997) define three kinds of federalism: economic federalism, 
cooperative federalism and democratic (majority-rule) federalism. 
                                                 
56 Of course, the EU tries to establish the internal market. However, Pelkmans (2006) argues that next to 
economic (trade) criteria an “real” internal market must also have a political dimension, which is lacking in 
Europe. 
57 Here, the complementary of policy areas is meant. Creating an internal market has e.g. consequences for 
production standards, but also for tax policies, environmental standards et cetera. When more policy areas 
are centralised, there will be “political spillovers” to other areas. Centralising is than more attractive. In 
section 9.4 this issue is discussed further. 
58 However, the EU has with the Maastricht Treaty some influence on the fiscal policies of the countries 
(see e.g. Eiffinger and De Haan, 2000). 
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Their definition of the first one (p. 45): “The principle of economic federalism prefers the 
most decentralised structure of government capable of internalising all economic 
externalities, subject to the constitutional constraint that all central government policies 
be decided by an elected or appointed central planner. This principle is in line with the 
standard public economic approach where efficiency is very important. Two other 
aspects, that are relevant when considering the discussion about the constitution, 
“political participation and liberties” and “freedom”, are of second-order importance in 
this model. 
The second principle is defined as (p. 48): “The principal of cooperative federalism is to 
prefer the most decentralised structure of government capable of internalising all 
economic externalities, subject to the constitutional constraint that all central government 
policies are agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives from each of the lower-
tier governments”. The authors state that the trust in central policymakers to solve the 
problems of inefficiency (caused by e.g. externalities) in an economy is not that strong, 
when this principle is used. Only when it is Pareto-improving to centralise, this will 
happen. However, it is possible to compensate the losers from a shift in responsibilities to 
the central government (so the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is used). In a Coasian economy, 
lower-levels of government are able to compensate each other exactly for all 
externalities. As Coase (1960) showed, when property rights are well-developed and 
there are no transaction costs the economy (and lower governments also) will be in an 
efficient equilibrium. In the cooperative federalism view, the task of the central 
government is to facilitate these efficient agreements between local governments. 
However, in practice external effects are difficult to measure, asymmetric information 
problems arise, enforceability of agreements is a problem and transaction costs may be 
too high. Inman and Rubinfield (1997, p. 50) conclude: “If economic federalism seems 
too biased in favour of centralisation, cooperative federalism seems to bias the fiscal 
constitution too far in the other direction”. 
The third principle of democratic federalism is based on the idea that the most 
decentralised structure of government capable of internalising all externalities is 
preferred, subject to the constraint that when agreement of centralisation of policies exist 
by 51 per cent of the elected lower tier representatives, centralisation occurs. This view 
lies in-between the two earlier, more extreme views. It includes the trade-off between 
efficiency (on the central level) with democratic and political problems arising at the 
central level.  
Inman and Rubinfield (2002) argue that the European constitution changed from 
decentralised federalism to centralised federalism. First there was the council of 
ministers, with veto power of every country, which attributed much power to the 
countries. Then, the constitution changed (by the European Act of 1986) with a 
replacement of the unanimity rule by the consultation procedure. The Commission got 
much more agenda setting influence at that time. From the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
onwards the co-decision procedure leads to democratic federalism.59 Nowadays, the 
                                                 
59 Related to this position are problems raised by Alesina and Perotti (2004). They state that there is a lack 
of clarity in the allocation of powers and prerogatives in the EU: jurisdictions are continuing overlapping 
and require inefficient balancing of powers. Transparency and accountability of EU-institutions are also 
lacking. Furthermore there is a sharp division between two visions of policymaking: (UK’s) laissez faire 
versus (French) dirigisme, where the latter is a wrong one according to the authors. 
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European parliament and the Council of Ministers co-decide about most themes, which 
give both parties the power to block policies. The Commission is a weak institutional 
organisation, without veto power (Ederveen et al., 2006). Nowadays, Inman and 
Rubinfield (2002) state that European decision-making looks like the decision-making 
procedures in the United States. There is also blocking power by the state’s Senate and 
the districts House, while the executive power is institutionally weak. 
Inman and Rubinfield (2002) argue that especially within the democratic federalism the 
risk of deference exists. Countries have to bargain about policy areas, which must be 
centralised. Side payments may be needed to get the votes of some countries. This may 
lead to excessive and inefficient levels of central influence or “I’ll-scratch-your-back-if-
you’ll-scratch-mine” policies. This results in common pool problems and “riding of the 
commons”. (Ederveen et al., 2006). Because costs of public goods can be shared by many 
countries, over-provision may result.  
Furthermore, the current decision-making procedures are inherently unstable in the EU, 
because there are always (different) majorities needed with inefficient consequences 
(Inman and Rubinfield, 2002).  
Pelkmans (2006) states that accountability is better on the local than on the central level. 
Seabright (1996) shows the same. Local democracy is a better enforcement mechanism to 
prevent policymakers acting as a Leviathan. In an incomplete contract model Seabright 
investigates under what circumstances central policy outperforms decentral 
policymaking.60 There is a trade-off between the advantages of policy co-ordination and 
diminished accountability under central policymakers. This accountability rests on the 
option to vote policymakers away. Indeed the bigger the region, the less influence people 
have on voting away policymakers: this is the reduced accountability considered. 
Seabright (1996) shows that even with regions with homogeneous preferences, central 
policymaking can be outperformed by decentral, more accountable, policymakers.  
Further the accountability of the EU is given by bureaucratic control (versus democratic 
control), which is not applicable to redistribution or allocative policies (Tabellini, 2003). 
Bureaucratic control is defined as control the goals reached, e.g. enforcing single market, 
price stability of the euro, which can be done by unpartisan bureaucrats. While “more 
political” choices should be made by politicians and remain under democratic control. A 
European social security system with democratic control is not possible under the current 
European constitution (Tabellini, 2003). 
Another argument against a (partial) centralisation of social policies in the EU is that 
shared responsibilities may lead to less needed actions by governments (Sapir, 2006). 
When e.g. reforms are needed and two government levels are (partially) responsible they 
may both hesitate to take responsibility for (unpopular) reforms. Therefore, the member 
states should be fully accountable for restructuring social security systems, according to 
Sapir (2006). 
 
Finally, the dynamic effect should be taken into account (Ederveen et al., 2006). 
Decentralisation may be efficient in the current state, but may be harmful if society 
changes. For example, globalisation may lead to higher mobility of production factors, 
which may have an effect on the optimal distribution of power between government 
                                                 
60 Seabright (1996) considers an incomplete contract model in which the outcomes are observable for 
anyone, but not verifiable. People are not able to see if policymakers act in their interests. 
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levels, as was shown in chapter 4. Together with the reasonable assumption that system 
changes are not symmetric, there is an option value of waiting. Indeed, when institutions 
in Europe are reformed this must be sustainable for some time: restructuring of the power 
again may not be possible (or very costly to achieve). Especially when policies are 
centralised, Ederveen et al. (2006) point out the risk of irreversibility. When society 
changes and the institutions lead to less efficient results, a reverse in responsibilities 
between governments may take a lot of time. The dynamic aspects of the 
(de)centralisation discussion must be taken seriously. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Political economy considerations must be taken into account when analysing the 
attribution of tasks to different government levels. Governmental behaviour is relevant to 
decide about the optimal decision level for social security. When governments are pure 
Leviathan, tax competition may enhance welfare. Edwards and Keen (1996) show that, 
more generally, it depends on the trade-off between the elasticity of the tax on mobile 
capital and the marginal propensity to waste revenues of the policy maker. 
Furthermore capture, lobbying and corruption should be taken into account. Plundering 
the common pool can be attractive for different parties. With respect to corruption and 
lobbying it depends on the specific circumstances whether it is more efficient to provide 
social security on a (de)central level. When interest groups have contrasting interests 
centralisation may be optimal, while the reverse may be welfare enhancing if they have 
the same interests. 
The threat of separation may be a reason to decentralise policies, but also co-ordination 
methods to which is turned in the next chapters may be a solution to different preferences 
between member states. 
Furthermore, voting paradoxes may occur in different political economy constructions. 
Bös (1979) showed that the same people may vote for redistribution when it is provided 
on the central level, while they would vote against it if it were provided on the decentral 
level.  
The constitutional setting is also relevant for the amount of social security provided by 
different governments. Europe is not a federation. Other mechanisms are at work. The 
specific characteristics of the EU-constitution matter. The specific decision procedures 
should be taken into account. Democratic federalism increases the risk of “riding the 
commons” and the EU with its bureaucratic control may not be able to take political 
decisions about social security systems 
Further, if voters could choose, inefficient, counterintuitive outcomes may result. Indeed, 
centralisation of redistribution with partially liberalised factor markets can reduce 
efficiency (Perotti, 1991). This may be directly relevant for Europe, with its mobile 
capital and relatively immobile labour market.61 
Moreover the dynamics of the attribution of competences in the EU should be taken into 
account. Especially with respect to attributing responsibilities to the EU it may be 
difficult to reverse this decision. Thereby, complementarities between different policy 
areas are relevant. Indeed, EU-policies on one area usually have consequences on other 
policy areas. 
Table 5 summarises the relevant factors and determinants raised in this chapter. 
                                                 
61 In chapter 9 the relevant factors are assessed empirically. 
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Table 5: Attributing social security: political economy considerations 
 
 
In part II the relevant factors to determine the optimal division of responsibilities for 
social security are analysed in greater detail. The tables provided in chapters 5, 6 and 7 
summarise the arguments and determinants for a complete (de)centralisation of social 
security functions for redistribution, insurance and both functions respectively.  
Next to these extreme solutions cooperation between governments is a possibility. In part 
III an analysis and assessment of these “in between” solutions is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approach  Central Determinants  Decentral Determinants 
Governmental behaviour       
Leviathan   elasticity of tax 
weighted versus 
marginal propensity 
to waste 
 policy competition; 
accountability 
 
       
common pool problems     democratic 
federalism 
accountability 
       
Corruption   accountability of 
politicians 
  accountability of 
politicians 
Lobby   contrasting interests 
lobby groups 
  aligned interests lobby 
groups  
   intradistrict 
differences in 
preferences 
   
Constitutional design       
threat of separation      great differences in 
preferences within a 
central government 
reforms needed     one government 
responsible 
 
complementarities  political 
spillovers 
centralisation of 
other policies 
   
dynamics     option value of 
waiting 
irreversibility of 
centralisation 
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Part III: Cooperation between governments 
 
 
 “The more appealing option is some kind of selective co-ordination of policies. But this 
too is a tricky matter”. 
 
Oates (2001, p. 143) 
 
A Social Europe: Political Utopia or Efficient Economics? 
58 
8. Cooperation between governments 
 
An extended framework, where only attention is paid to a complete (de)centralisation of 
responsibilities for social security has little worth. Cooperation between member states 
and the EU must be analysed as “solutions in between”.  This is in line with the 
subsidiarity principle laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997, article 5): cooperation 
can be seen as a proportionality measure. The subsidiarity principle implies that 
decisions should be taken at the lowest government level, unless goals could be better 
reached at a higher level. Pelkmans (2006) developed a subsidiarity test for the EU, in 
which credible cooperation is a preferred alternative for centralisation. In this chapter 
the (dis)advantages of cooperation are analysed in greater detail. An assessment is made 
of matching grants, delayed integration, minimum harmonisation policies, flexible 
integration and the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
 
8.1 Functional test subsidiarity 
Pelkmans (2006) defines the actual EU approach to subsidiarity as laid down in the 
Amsterdam Treaty as a simple cost-benefit analysis of (de)centralisation. Indeed 
subsidiarity and proportionality are in the heart of the European discussion about the 
division of task between government levels in Europe. Pelkmans (2006) develops a 
functional test of subsidiarity that can be used to provide the cost-benefit analysis. The 
author explicitly states that this test is functional and neutral. So, it does not have the 
intention to be more in favour of decentralisation or centralisation. It is a two-way 
approach.62 
 
The subsidiarity test that assigns responsibilities to the member states or the EU consists 
of five steps, Pelkmans (2006, p. 8): 
 
1. Identify whether a measure falls within the area of shared competences (when the 
EU has exclusive rights, it is useless to apply this test). 
2. The “need to act in common” test: apply the criteria (are there economies of scale 
and / or externalities?).  
3. Verify, whether credible cooperation is feasible. 
4. If 1 and 2 are confirmed, and 3 is denied, then the assignment is to the EU level. 
5. Proportionality. Define to what extent implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement should be assigned to the EU. 
 
The usual public economic arguments can be found in this test. Only when the benefits of 
centralisation outweigh the costs, the EU should take responsibility. Pelkmans (2006) 
pays special attention to the credibility of cooperation between countries. According to 
his assessment, credible cooperation is preferred before centralisation. Credibility is low 
when (imperfect) information asymmetries between governments are high, the benefits of 
threat are high, the discount rate is high and monitoring is difficult. With low credibility, 
national governments may cheat and appointments can be worthless. In this chapter we 
                                                 
62 Indeed, subsidiarity is usually biased to decentralisation as being optimal, which is a one-way approach. 
Only under very strict and unrealistic assumptions (e.g. full information for the central government, 
homogeneous preferences, non-uniform public good provision) centralisation is seen as optimal. 
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look at “proportionality measures” in greater detail and assess whether they might be 
feasible. 
 
8.2 Matching grants 
A common reason to centralise policies is the existence of externalities. Because member 
states do not take the effects of their policies on other regions into account, a suboptimal 
level of (public) goods is provided. Another way to induce national governments to take 
external effects into account is the provision of matching grants by the EU. In this section 
it is analysed whether matching grants are a good alternative for a pure central or 
decentral provision of social security in the European Union or not. 
 
The basics 
Oates (1972) already stated that when we leave the world without externalities, there is a 
role for the central government. When decentral governments do not internalise costs or 
benefits that are related to their public goods consumption, they do not provide the 
optimal amount of public goods. Indeed, with positive (negative) externalities too little 
(much) is provided. This can be corrected by a central government, which provides 
matching grants so that the marginal social welfare equals the marginal costs of providing 
public goods (Gordon, 1983). Then, Samulesons’ rule for the optimal provision of public 
goods is fulfilled (see box 3). 
 
Box 3: the Samuelson rule as benchmark 
When considering efficiency, all cited authors take the Samuelson rule as benchmark. 
This rule is based on his famous article “The pure theory of public expenditure” of 1954. 
Here, the author determines the optimal provision of pure public goods. Everyone 
benefits from pure public goods (they are non-rival) and it is not possible to exclude 
persons from the consumption of these goods (they are non-exclusive).  
Since everyone benefits from the availability of pure public goods, the market under 
provides them. Indeed, only private value counts when people buy a good. Equilibrium in 
private markets is given when marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 
But what is the optimal provision of pure public goods? Samuelson states that the optimal 
provision of public goods is given, when the sum of the marginal benefits of all persons 
in an economy equals the marginal costs of producing it. This is called the Samuelson 
rule for the optimal provision of public goods. 
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Some examples 
Different mechanisms are developed to provide the optimal amount of public goods. 
Boadway and Flatters (1982) developed a model with equalisation payments by the 
central government to provinces for quasi-public goods.63 They consider mobility of both 
factors of production and myopic provinces (that do not take the mobility of factors of 
production into account when making policy). They showed that in this context federal 
equalisation payments might increase efficiency and equity.  
One of the most cited contributions in this discussion is that of Wildasin (1991). This 
author investigates at what level redistribution should occur within a common labour 
market. This labour market is defined as a market, where some portion of the work force 
is able to switch from one jurisdiction to another. This analysis differs from that of Pauly 
(1973) and Brown Oates (1987) in the sense that labour migration has an effect on wages 
in both countries. As such, incomes are endogenously determined.  
 
Wildasin (1991) assumes that there are two groups in a jurisdiction: mobile poor and 
immobile rich.64 The poor provide a unit of labour and receive wages, while the rich get 
the remaining income. Rich are altruistic and they are taxed lump sum to finance the 
redistribution to the poor in their region. The poor only care about maximising their 
utility. In the decentral equilibrium it is easy to see that the poor must get the same in 
each region. This is less than the optimum, because there are spillovers coming from 
redistribution at the local level.  
Wildasin investigates how matching grants by the central government should be 
organised to reach an efficient outcome. The author shows that in equilibrium the poor 
should get equal wages in every jurisdiction. This implies that the government should 
subsidise jurisdictions with lower preferences for redistribution more than regions where 
preferences for redistribution are high. With asymmetric preferences between 
jurisdictions, it is shown that it is indeed optimal to provide different levels of grants to 
different jurisdictions. However, the result is that poor get the same transfer everywhere 
in the federation, which is the same result as in the theory of Oates (1972) with 
centralised redistribution.  
This result can be contrasted with the standard decentralisation literature, where decentral 
governments can act according to the preferences of their inhabitants. However, in 
Wildasin’s matching grants solution, redistribution levels are the same within the central 
government. Using this model thus provides no argument for matching grants at the 
central level, because pure central redistribution gives the same results. The author 
suggests that more information on the local level could be an argument for that. 
                                                 
63 Quasi-public goods are goods that are not pure public (non-rival and non-exclusive) but also not pure 
private (rival and exclusive). The degree of publicness is measured by the standard formulae used by 
Musgrave (1959). Indeed, when redistribution is based on the preferences of the rich, this can be seen as a 
quasi-public good. Insurance mechanisms can, depending on the circumstances, also be seen as quasi-
public goods. 
64 The author assumes further that some poor are mobile without costs. Furthermore Wildasin (1991) claims 
that when the mobility assumption is reversed, so that the rich are mobile and the poor immobile, the main 
results of the analysis are the same.  
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Furthermore he states that –despite the fact that the model gives no formal arguments for 
matching grants- this mechanism is used in practice.65 
 
Drawbacks of matching grants 
Next to the solution that social security benefits must be the same when people are 
mobile, matching grants have other drawbacks. These are considered now, starting with 
the need for myopic member states. 
 
The need for myopic member states 
Pfingsten and Wagener (1997) consider intra- and interregional redistribution in a 
federation in the framework developed by Wildasin (1991). The results of a central 
planner, who maximises total utility, are equal to the results in the Wildasin article: 
wages for the poor equal to their marginal productivity and redistribution of income from 
rich to poor regions. Pfingsten and Wagener (1997) distinguish two objections against 
this approach. First, if is assumed that states do not have any power: the dictatorial 
government decides. Second, there is redistribution between regions, which may induce 
myopic regional governments to oppose this policy. Ignoring these regional objections 
comes with high political costs, the authors state. Therefore they state there are second 
best approaches: either the regions have to face balanced budgets and the central 
government redistributes, or redistribution is left to the decentral government but 
interregional redistribution is left to the central authority. Another solution is that regions 
are responsible for both intra- and interregional redistribution. Because the poor can 
migrate in this model, the standard under provision of social security results. 
Now consider the case where interregional redistribution occurs at the central level and 
intraregional redistribution at the local level. First, the authors argue that interregional 
redistribution is not based on equity, but on allocative efficiency grounds only. 
Interregional redistribution is based on compensation for the mobile poor to regions, 
which redistribute intraregional. There are two kinds of externalities: first the usual 
(utility) spillovers from regional redistribution, and second, the effect on the federal 
budget. Because of interregional redistribution, the second effect is also present. When a 
transfer mechanism that internalises all externalities is developed, this (second best) 
equilibrium is efficient. The authors distinguish three mechanisms to reach the 
internalisation of external effects. 
Pfingsten and Wagener (1997) first consider a system where only redistribution occurs 
from the rich to the poor within the federal state. The rich in a region have to pay an 
“immobility premia” to all the poor in the other regions. The authors show that with 
myopic provinces the efficient solution can be reached.66 Every poor gets the same 
subsidy in the end. 
A second mechanism, matching grants, was developed by Wildasin. As was shown, this 
may result in an efficient solution.67 
                                                 
65 The last argument is –of course- not convincing at al in a theoretical paper. However, for a theoretical 
political economy analysis of the existence of matching grants in practice, see Dixit and Londregan (1998). 
66 However, when local governments take the “immobility premiums" into account in their reaction 
function, this will not be a Nash equilibrium and inefficient low levels of redistribution result. 
67 Pfingsten and Wagener (1997) come to the same conclusion as Wildasin (1991). However, they state that 
also with different regions the same poll tax on the rich must be set, instead of Wildasin, who argued that 
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The third approach is Pigouvian subsidies on the number of the poor. This implies that 
rich people in a region pay an amount to rich people in other regions based on the number 
of the poor in the jurisdiction. Then, regions have bigger incentives to attract the poor. 
The authors are not able to derive if the efficient solution would be reached in 
equilibrium. 
The last approach is Pigouvian subsidies on the transfers in other regions. This approach 
is the same as used by Brown and Oates (1987). In this system each region has to pay a 
subsidy per euro spend on redistribution in another region. This system can be efficient. 
However it is very complex to implement. Furthermore it is likely that rational regional 
governments can gain by an under provision of social security. 
Pfingsten and Wagener (1997) conclude that with myopic regional governments a 
combination of regional and central redistribution can be efficient. However, when they 
act strategically this effect may decline and levels of social security that are too low may 
result. They warn for the case that there is no role for a central authority in Europe, 
because even with relatively small mobility patterns, the negative effects on redistribution 
levels may be reasonable. 
 
Figuieres and Hindrinks (2002) also conclude that with rational regions, Oates (1972) 
linear matching grants (to provide redistribution) may not be efficient. Therefore they use 
the Wildasin (1991) model. They argue that, when “Ricardian equivalence” for 
jurisdictions holds, provinces take into account that they pay parts of the transfers 
provided by the central government.68 Therefore, they provide lower levels of public 
goods. Figuieres and Hindriks (2002) find that matching grants can be an efficient 
solution, but that they must be higher than in the standard case. 
 
Flypaper effect 
In the discussion about matching grants the “flypaper effect” should also be taken into 
account (Hines and Thaler, 1995). This principle of “money sticks where it hits” implies 
that politicians and bureaucrats make different choices when they get “money from 
heaven” (from other governments) than when they have to raise taxes from their own 
inhabitants. Evidence from local governments in the Netherlands shows that this effect 
seems to be quiet substantial (Allers and Sterks, 1996).  
However, the goal of matching grants is indeed to reduce marginal costs of lower level 
governments, so that externalities are internalised and lower governments provide the 
efficient level of public goods. Problems may arise, when the central government has 
incomplete information or when local governments overreact and “match” too much of 
their budget on the central governments’ matching grants. 
Another argument why the “flypaper effect” in reality might be measured is that local 
governments do not face the consequences of the behavioural effects (i.e. dead weight 
                                                                                                                                                 
with different regions poll taxes should differ. The outcome that matching grants can be efficient is, 
however, the same. 
68 Ricardian equivalence comes from public economics, where it is assumed that people do not change their 
behaviour when governments increase (or reduce) their deficit. When the deficit increases, it is assumed 
that consumers know that they have to pay higher taxes later, therefore they consume less now to save for 
the future liabilities. The reverse (reducing deficits) holds equally. So consumers are resistant for 
government debt. 
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losses) of taxes. This reduces the costs of public goods for lower level governments 
(Hines and Thaler, 1995).  
 
Tabellini (2003) argues that matching grants in the European context may not be 
efficient. Given the high tax rates (and big public sector) in Europe, it seems optimal to 
compensate countries in a lump sum way for negative externalities. Binding grants are 
likely to induce more inefficiency than still occurs. Tabellini (2003, p. 89): “Tying such 
funds to specific uses, or trying to identify from the centre who are the most worthy 
recipients, is likely to add inefficiencies. If national governments need to buy consensus 
at home to promote European integration (e.g., building infrastructure in poor regions), 
they can find efficient ways to do that without any constraint imposed by the EU”. Here 
the asymmetric information argument comes again into the debate.  
 
Assessment 
Matching grants can induce national governments to internalise the external effects when 
providing social security. However, this comes with a cost: with mobile production 
factors redistribution levels end up to be the same in all countries, even when people in 
the different countries have different preferences (Wildasin, 1991). Furthermore, in a 
political economy context winners and losers of the matching grant system depend on the 
grants arrangement chosen (Dixit and Londregan, 1998). 
Moreover, there are other drawbacks of matching grants. When member states take their 
contributions to the European grants into account, the efficient level of redistribution 
cannot be reached anymore. Thereby, experience shows that “money sticks where it hits”, 
inducing inefficient high levels of social security spending in case Europe would give 
subsidies to the member states.  
It may be concluded that matching grants can be welfare enhancing, because they can 
internalise the external effects of social security. However, this advantage must be 
weighed against the loss of heterogeneity, the assumption of myopic governments needed 
and the flypaper effect. Furthermore the central government should have sufficient 
information. Hence, the arguments to introduce a matching grant system for social 
security in Europe do not seem to be that strong. 
 
8.3 Delayed integration 
Labour mobility can bring serious negative external effects as was shown in chapter 6. 
Centralisation of social security policies can reduce these effects. Yet, the negative 
effects can also be reduced with other means, for example with delayed integration. In 
this section the principle of delayed integration is analysed. 
 
Sinn (2002a, 2002b) states, in the light of European enlargement, that free mobility of 
labour in Europe can lead to social security competition and lower social security levels. 
At the same time, efficient labour mobility can increase economic efficiency. Therefore, 
Sinn (2002a) states that Europe should choose a model in which beneficial migration 
occurs, while inefficient migration does not. Sinn (2001) defines inefficient migration in 
two parts. First, the already considered migration induced by higher social security (and 
other public goods) levels. Second, the crowding out of the unemployed by migrants. 
When labour markets are not flexible, migration may lead to more unemployed in the 
A Social Europe: Political Utopia or Efficient Economics? 
 
 64
receiving country, which can be considered as welfare reducing migration. The author 
therefore proposes the idea of delayed integration combined with the temporary home-
country principle for social security. This implies that migrants do not have the same 
social security rights as the initial inhabitants of a country. Sinn (2002a) suggests that a 
“waiting” time of 5 till 10 years for full integration is reasonable. Immigrants can only 
claim social security from (the levels of) their home-countries, so inefficient migration 
for social security is banned out. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of the origin and employment principle are discussed 
by Richter (2001). When the origin principle is chosen, governments have less incentives 
to act according to the preferences of the people. This is an ideal environment for 
Leviathan bureaucrats. Further, the origin principle is at odds with the freedom of choice 
individuals have: it makes them “slaves in the name of states”. An advantage of this 
principle is that the negative consequences of regional shocks are mitigated. Indeed, 
when people move due to a negative shock in the home country, they share their incomes 
with their former country. 
The employment principle leads to pressure on the welfare of the immobile people and 
can lead to a tax race to the bottom.69 
Delayed integration can be seen as a compromise between both principles. It may not be 
considered as strictly optimal, but it can reduce the negative effects of both extreme 
options and can therefore be an interesting policy option for Europe. It can be an answer 
to the “fundamental trade-off” between the European objectives of subsidiarity and the 
free movement of people (Richter, 2002). Weichenrieder and Busch (2005) show that in a 
theoretical model delayed integration may imply a time inconsistency problem for 
governments. Governments may promise lower tax rates for the high incomes after the 
period of delayed integration, but these are not credible. In their model -under specific 
assumptions- delayed integration may even be a perfect remedy against the race to the 
bottom.70 
 
Delayed integration can be defended by the fiscal impact of immigration. Sinn and 
Werding (2001) showed for instance that for the government the net present value per 
immigrant in West Germany was (very) negative when immigrants stayed for a short 
period of time. When they stayed longer –for a considerable period of time- net present 
value became positive (see table 6). Gustafsson and Oosterberg (2001) came to similar 
conclusions for Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Or as Sinn (1994) stated –who does not separate between the functions of social security- the 
employment principle undermines the insurance functions of the welfare state. 
70 With altruistic, mobile rich (and immobile poor) e.g. social security is provided according to the 
Samuelson rule, so the first best solution results. However, with mobile rich, Bertrand competition between 
two symmetric countries and infinite time periods, a race to the bottom results.  
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Table 6: Direct fiscal impact of immigration, West Germany (1997) 
 
        Source: Sinn and Werner (2001) 
 
However, there may be difficulties with the principle of delayed integration. When the 
home country has to provide social security for their former inhabitants during some 
time, monitoring behaviour of recipients may become a problem. A (partial) solution can 
be the delegation of monitoring to another member state during the transition period. 
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Moreover, possibly a transfer scheme for contributions (and taxes) for social security 
between different countries should be needed to compensate home countries for the time 
they remain responsible for their initial inhabitants. 
 
Political assimilation 
In political economy models political assimilation may also be important for the optimal 
decision level with respect to social security. Michel et al. (1998) developed a model in 
which immigrants get benefits and can only vote after a certain period in a country. They 
compare this with a model in which immigrants become citizens immediately. They 
assume that only citizens can vote and that the altruistic, skilled rich have a majority. 
In a small open economy, they show that redistribution is zero in the reference situation 
(migrants become citizens immediately). However, when the mobile, low-skilled 
immigrants have to wait for one period, redistribution is possible in this economy. In that 
case immigrants work hard in the first period. The original citizens, skilled and unskilled, 
win. In the second period the immigrants have fewer incentives to work, because they get 
access to social security rights. Michel et al. (1998) show that the initial low-skilled 
people in a country lose because of lower redistribution levels, while the utility of the 
high-skilled people increases compared to the situation without migration.  
It should be kept in mind that the approach taken by Michels et al. (1998) is very                                             
restrictive. The authors do not allow the assimilation policy as a choice variable for 
example. Further, the political majority is assumed by high-skilled people and only low-
skilled people migrate. In the European context there can be doubts about the relevance 
of such strong restrictions.71 
 
Alternatives72 
Sinn (2002a) argues that the alternatives for delayed integration lead to less welfare. Full 
migration leads to social policy competition and costs for the receiving countries. With 
the use of quota economic interesting people are not selected. Selective migration for 
“needy immigrants” by bureaucrats implies discrimination of weaker Europeans. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that bureaucrats are able to distinguish which migration is 
welfare improving and which is not.  
At last, a total injunction of migration will make efficient migration impossible, which 
sharply contrasts with the European objective of the freedom of mobility. 
 
Assessment 
Delayed integration has the potential to be a reasonable compromise between the home 
country and the employment principle. It may reduce pressures on social security systems 
and has the advantage that efficient migration flows can still enhance allocative 
efficiency. Further, delayed integration seems to fit within the European context.73 Both 
the subsidiarity principle and the four freedoms are in the heart of the European Treaties, 
                                                 
71 However, there may be some “natural delay” in the practical existence of immigrants, because 
integration takes time and political rights and participation come with the years. Mazza and Van Winden 
(1996) developed a model in which the consequences on groups of this “natural delay” are analysed. 
72 In section 8.4 minimum harmonisation levels will be assessed as a policy alternative. 
73 Richter (2001) argues that with respect to social security the time component in European laws should 
change from 12 months (of delayed integration) to a longer period. The same holds for tax laws, which may 
according to OECD Model Convention, Article 15, may not be longer than 6 months. 
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but there are tensions between these objectives when specific policy areas are considered. 
In a natural way the principle of delayed integration is at work nowadays. Indeed, for 
specific social security instruments there are (time) requirements before one has 
entitlement rights. To get the Dutch unemployment benefits, one has to work for several 
years for example. Another (Dutch) example is that state pensions are proportionally 
based on the time people live in the Netherlands during their life between the age of 15 
till 65.  
Nevertheless, there are tensions between the free movement of people -which only seems 
to hold for workers (and their dependants) in practice- and the economic consequences of 
attributing the right to get benefits in another country for everyone (Richter, 2002). 
Delayed integration may than be an attractive compromise. However, there are 
implementation problems that deserve more attention. Monitoring and reducing moral 
hazard, developing compensation schemes between countries and the specific (legal) 
framework should be developed.   
 
8.3 Flexible integration 
A larger Europe will probably result in a more heterogeneous EU (Tabellini, 2003). This 
decreases the desirability of centralisation of policies. Furthermore, according to this 
author, there is no common European identity and Europeans do not accept common 
policies decided by majority as is usual in the European countries 
The proposal of Persson et al. (1996) to choose for “flexible integration” may reduce the 
disadvantages sketched by Tabellini (2003). Because the countries differ to a great extent 
within Europe open partnerships should be possible. This way, countries with similar 
preferences can choose to form common policies on certain policy areas. Based on an 
analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys Ahrens et al. (2006) also strongly recommend a 
flexible integration approach for different policy areas in Europe.74 
A formal dynamic analysis of flexible integration (or “enhanced cooperation” as they call 
it) is given by Bordignon and Brusco (2006). The authors show that flexible integration 
may indeed be Pareto-improving when preferences between countries differ. However, 
there is a risk that European countries that do not participate are penalised.75 Alesina et 
al. (2005) come in their endogenous political model to the same conclusions. However, 
the authors also show –although they are not able to prove this proposition formally- that 
when countries can decide to delegate only the parts with the strongest spillovers and / or 
weakest heterogeneity to the central government, this results always in the same or more 
efficiency. This way the status quo problem raised by Lockwood (2002) and the related 
“small size bias” are reduced.76 
Enhanced cooperation, in which parts of the EU can agree on common policies can also 
increase welfare. Nevertheless, Alesina et al. (2005) show both winners and losers. 
Countries with extreme preferences are winners, while median countries may loose. 
However, this system increases the size of the union compared with the uniformity (the 
same policy for all countries) assumption. The authors conclude that there is a trade-off 
                                                 
74 In the next chapter, attention is paid to different preferences for social security in Europe. 
75 So, it is no surprise that for the implementation of “closer cooperation” (which is flexible integration) in 
the EU there are demanding conditions (Hall, 2000). 
76 The “small size bias” means that international unions do not reach their optimal size, because of the 
endogenous policy-making at the union level (Alesina et al. 2005). 
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between a simple “rigid” uniformity approach and a more flexible, but more difficult to 
implement approach. This lies at the heart of the debate about the European Constitution. 
Therefore, to implement efficient flexible integration in the European context, losers 
should have influence on the decisions made by the countries that cooperate (or the 
cooperating countries should –credibly- take the interests of the non-participating 
countries into account). This may be hard to do. 
Another drawback with respect to the governance structure of flexible integration is that a 
widespread use of this measure will make the EU-constitution more complex, which 
reduces democratic control by member states (Hall, 2000). 
 
Social federalism 
Cantillon (2004) promotes a division of responsibilities between governments on a 
functional basis. The author states that some social policy measures should be attributed 
to the EU, while others should stay with the member states. This is what she calls “social 
federalism”, which contrasts with fiscal federalism in the sense that traditional fiscal 
federalism learns that redistribution should, in principle, be attributed to the central level. 
She argues that American social federalism with shared responsibilities between the 
states and the federation, coincides with the functional theory of federalism. In America, 
with its hybrid form of fiscal federalism, there are matching grants for regions, but the 
main responsibilities for redistribution are allocated to the central level, while 
development policies, which is from a financial point of view the major part of the social 
security system, are attributed to the state level. Compared with the EU the social system 
of the United States has a more clear constitution, with more homogeneous social 
redistribution and with more financial compensation between states. 
Next to integration between some member states, flexible integration can also be 
established by some groups of people. Pieters and Vansteenkiste (1993) e.g. proposed to 
form a “thirteenth state”: a European social security system for intra-community 
migrants, indeed only those who want (and benefit) from it.77 This could be interesting 
for groups such as international workers, students and “pensionado’s”.78 Administrative 
problems can be reduced (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Thereby, risk pools may 
become broader and therefore more efficient.79 A potential drawback is the adverse 
selection problem. Indeed, when people may choose to participate in social insurance 
systems a separating equilibrium may result. People who face high risks want full 
insurance, while people who face low risks do not want to pay the premiums needed and 
take no (or less) insurances.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Indeed, at that time Europe consists of 12 member states. 
78 See e.g. the discussions about the Dutch “pensionado’s”, who live in Southern Europe and get (worse) 
state health care there, while they have to pay the (higher) Dutch premiums. Or see students, who may (or 
may not) keep their student benefits from their home-country, when studying abroad. 
79 The European pension directive can be very helpful to reap these economies of scale. Second-pillar 
pensions can than be provided on a European scale. Furthermore the risk of too low pensions for mobile 
workers will be reduced (Doorn, 2007). 
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Assessment 
Flexible integration between countries or groups of people seems a promising, welfare 
improving approach for Europe. In the EU-27 differences in welfare systems and 
preferences may lead to welfare improving coalitions between specific countries or 
between different groups. However, the outsiders may loose. This can be (partly) 
corrected by taking the interest of the non-participating nations into account, but it will 
certainly create political problems. 
Furthermore, there may be an adverse selection problem. Therefore, the social security 
instruments with the least redistributive elements are, from an economic point of view, 
the first that can be nominated for a flexible approach. Indeed, within e.g. an actuarial fair 
(defined contribution) pension system, adverse selection is not a problem. It would be 
interesting to investigate in greater detail the potential benefits that such flexible systems 
may provide. 
 
8.4 Minimum harmonisation policies 
Cantillon (2004) advocates binding minimum agreements. These are necessary because 
the integration of capital, product and labour markets (and their institutions) leads to 
pressure on the social security systems in the new and old member states (Cantillon, 
2004, p. 191): “For the less developed welfare states, such binding European agreements 
can serve as a lever for the development of an adequate minimum protection. For the 
most developed welfare states, such agreements can help guard against a risky erosion of 
minimum protection”. 
These minimum protection levels can be set proportionally to GDP, so that they are not 
too high for low- and not too low for high- developed countries. Personal redistribution is 
in this way attributed to the member states, but minimum requirements –in this social 
union- are declared by Europe. According to Cantillon (2004) this reduces the risks of a 
social race to the bottom and has the advantages of decentral provision of social security. 
 
Drawbacks 
However, there may be problems with the introduction of minimum harmonisation levels. 
Sinn and Ochel (2003) e.g. consider a very stylised model of the consequences of 
minimum harmonised social security levels in the enlarged European Union. They state 
that when the EU sets conditions for economic convergence, social convergence will 
automatically follow. Price equalisation, combined with factor mobility and competition 
between country systems lead to this social convergence. The setting of minimum 
harmonisation levels is detrimental for labour mobility and slows down the speed of 
economic convergence.80  
In their migration model the authors show that, without social harmonisation, migration is 
efficient and convergence occurs. With minimum standards for replacement incomes, 
migration levels decrease (the wedge between low wage countries and high wage 
countries decreases) and unemployment rises in the poorer (East European) countries.  
                                                 
80 However, Sinn and Ochel (2003) do not state that regulations and / or a social policy of the EU is not 
desirable in the end, e.g. to prevent the disadvantages of tax competition. During the process of 
convergence centralised influence on social insurance is detrimental, they argue. 
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Together with the finances needed to pay more and higher social security benefits, the 
economy grows slower. In the end, there is less convergence of economic growth and 
social convergence.81 
The authors argue that this is what happened during the reunification of Germany. East 
Germany got the same social benefit levels as West Germany, which resulted in mass 
unemployment, financing problems for social security and slower convergence. The same 
occurred in the Italian Mezzogiorno. 
Sinn and Ochel (2003) warn for the consequences of the EU-constitution on economic 
development: “The problem lies in the proclamation of European citizenship (article I 8), 
in combination with the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of national citizenship 
(Article I 4), the proclaimed goals of social protection and social cohesion (Article I 3 
and I 13), the provision of extensive social inclusion rights (Article II 34), the setting of 
minimum social standards (Article I 13 in connection with Article III 104), as well as the 
co-ordination of Member States’ social policies (Article I 14) “. This leads to pledges for 
every immigrant to pay for social contributions in the country to which they emigrate, 
combined with rights to get all social benefits. Sinn and Ochel (2003) state that high 
benefits for immigrants will result. This induces too much migration. The authors 
therefore propose delayed integration, such that migration takes place but at an efficient 
level. People pay taxes and social security contribution in the new country, but have only 
partial rights. So, efficient migration takes place, the race to the bottom will not occur, 
the harmonisation of replacement incomes is not necessary and the economic forces that 
bring social convergence will do their work.   
Next to the problems raised by Sinn and Ochel (2003), there are serious practical and 
technical drawbacks on minimum harmonisation rules. How to set standards for such 
diverse countries with such diverse systems, how to evaluate them and which incentive 
effects should be expected (Goudswaard and Vording, 1996)?  
 
Sinn (2002a, 2002b) argues that setting minimum social regulatory standards is generally 
not welfare enhancing. Only in a market where employers have monopsony power, 
setting minimum social standards may be desirable. Usually, however, social standards 
are part of the wages paid. More risks on the working floor result in compensation wages 
and the other way around. There is no (economic) reason to prevent international 
competition on both elements. Sinn (2002a, 2002b) states clearly that competition on 
social standards and social security competition are very different things. And that, only 
when the last one occurs, intervention is needed.82  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Sin and Ochel (2003) also consider social standards. They show that having the same social standards 
leads to inefficient high levels of migration, leading to dead weight losses and less convergence speed. 
82 However, this is too simple to conclude. Indeed, people may value (some) minimum working conditions 
in other countries. In such case, intervention may be welfare improving. 
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Assessment 
The practical and technical implications of minimum harmonisation levels are a serious 
disadvantage of this mechanism. Furthermore there are theoretical arguments why 
minimum harmonisation levels are not preferable. Social convergence may decline and 
for social security standards competition may be economically efficient. Furthermore, as 
will be shown in the next chapter there are no signs that a race to the bottom –that should 
be avoided with this measure- occurs actually in Europe.83 
 
8.5 Open Method of Co-ordination 
Some authors state that there is an asymmetry between policies that promote market 
efficiency and policies that promote equality and social protection. Scharpf (2002) 
proposes a re-establishment of the constitutional parallelism between “market-making” 
and “market-correcting”. 
The used Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) is too weak to elevate these 
constitutional problems, according to this author. Policy learning occurs, but is not 
enough to re-establish the balance. According to Scharpf (2002) framework directives 
(European rules) are needed for all countries, whereby the OMC can be used for groups 
of similar countries. A description of the OMC is given in box 4. 
 
Box 4: the Open Method of Co-ordination (based on Cantillon, 2004) 
The OMC with respect to social policies was laid down in the Treaty of Nice (2001). It is 
a relatively new method of the EU to harmonise pension and employment policies and to 
reach “social inclusion”. Member states co-ordinate their policies to reach common 
policy goals. With respect to social inclusion the Lisbon agenda provides a framework to 
reach this, consisting of three policy areas: 1) eradicating policy and social exclusion;  
2) adequate and sustainable pensions and 3) accessible, high quality and sustainable 
health and long-term care.  
The main parts of the OMC are agreeing on common objectives and indicators to 
measure if these objectives are reached. National reports should be made how to reach 
these goals, which are assessed by the EU. Furthermore, the EU makes a common action 
program to promote policy cooperation, disperse good practices and to establish learning 
effects. 
Against other kinds of law, the goals are described, not the way to reach these goals. 
Output counts. Because there are no sanctions when countries do not reach the promised 
goals, the OMC is often seen as soft law. Diverse economists therefore argue that OMC 
will have (very) few effects in reality (Scharpf, 2002). 
 
Goudswaard and Van Riel (2004) distinguish three kinds of social policy co-ordination in 
the EU. First, co-ordination of social protection systems related to migrant workers, 
pensioners and students. Second, minimum harmonisation of some working conditions. 
Third the OMC, which is about social inclusion and reforming health and pension 
systems. The authors conclude that there is no urgent economic need for social policy co-
ordination on the EU level (the race to the bottom seems not to occur). However from 
especially a political point of view they state that some (open) co-ordination may be 
                                                 
83 However, indeed the question may be raised if this is likely to happen in the future. 
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wished. Thereby, there may be some economies of scale from central co-ordination (e.g. 
benchmarking and putting European pressure on member states to reform inefficient 
sectors).84 
Zeitlin (2005) investigated empirically if the expected effects of the OMC in the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) do really take place. First, it should be stated that 
causality between the OMC and policies of the member states is difficult to prove. 
Indeed, other –more important- mechanisms have simultaneously influence on the change 
of social policies. However, the author tries to distinguish the effects of the EES-OMC. 
He found that policy thinking (as economy of scale), peer pressure and naming and 
shaming are forces that are taken place. Learning effects from decentral policies are not 
found as first order (direct) effect, but could be there in mutual learning. However, the 
general conclusion is that the OMC indeed seems to induce some economies of scale. 
 
Assessment 
The OMC can provide some economies of scale. By policy thinking, naming and 
shaming and putting pressure on reforms of inefficient social security mechanisms this 
could be done. Furthermore, there is room for mutual policy learning from good 
examples by the benchmark studies done. However, the OMC is soft law. Member states 
are fully responsible to reach the commonly agreed goals and can not be held accountable 
for results. Therefore some people argue that the OMC will have little positive effects. 
The future will learn whether the economies of scale will be realised. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
When assessing the optimal division of responsibilities within the EU centralisation 
measures should be proportional. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle and tests could be 
used. In this chapter four cooperation methods were analysed and assessed. 
First, matching grants as “solution in between”. It was shown that although theoretically 
interesting, in practice a lot of assumptions have to be fulfilled to make this a feasible 
alternative. There should be externalities of social security provision in member states. 
Whether they are relevant in Europe is discussed in the next chapter, which is based on 
empirical research. Thereby, member states should be myopic, the EU should have all the 
relevant information, “money may not stick where it hits” and a homogeneous provision 
of social security as a result should not be a reasonable problem.85 Therefore the 
arguments to introduce a matching grant system for social security in Europe do not seem 
to be that strong. 
Secondly flexible integration was assessed. This seems a promising approach. Specific 
countries or groups of people can together integrate in a social security system to reap the 
economies of scale (less administrative procedures and a broader -and more efficient- risk 
pool). Due to the adverse selection problem this system gives opportunities for the least 
redistributive function of social security. A defined contribution system for mobile 
European workers can be an example of that. However, there are practical problems of 
                                                 
84 In a theoretical model Conesa and Kruger (1999) analyse e.g. that all the considered efficient reforms 
from an unfunded to a funded pension system will never get a political majority in a country. European 
pressure may help to facilitate efficient reforms. 
85 However, as will be shown in chapter 9 Europe can be characterised by (strong) heterogeneous 
preferences. 
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such a system and when countries integrate flexibly the interests of the non-participating 
nations and / or groups of people should be taken into account. Further investigations on 
the solutions to these problems can contribute to a deeper assessment of this approach. 
The third method, minimum harmonisation rules, do not seem to provide an economically 
interesting alternative. Theoretically they can even lead to less social convergence. 
Moreover, the introduction will lead to serious practical and technical problems. 
Fourth, it was assessed whether the OMC will be a useful European cooperation 
alternative. Member states remain responsible for social security policies with this 
approach. Theoretically, some economies of scale due to policy thinking, peer and reform 
pressure could be reached by this approach. There is some evidence that these effects are 
occurring. However, further empirical evidence is needed to conclude whether the OMC 
will really have the expected effects. 
 
In part III (and chapter 8) different cooperation methods between governments were 
analysed and assessed. For developing an extended framework to attribute social security 
functions to different government levels, these “solutions in between” must be taken into 
account. Indeed, centralisation must be proportional. The most welfare enhancing 
approach may lie in between a complete central or decentral provision of social security 
functions. 
It was argued that delayed and flexible integration and the OMC are promising forms of 
cooperation, while the setting of minimum harmonisation standards and matching grants 
seem not to be welfare improving alternatives. The results of this analysis are used to 
construct the framework for the attribution of responsibilities for the functions of social 
security in chapter 10. However before presenting the extended framework, the empirical 
relevance of the described relevant factors for Europe are analysed in chapter 9. 
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Part IV: The optimal decision level for social security in Europe 
 
 
“The relevant question here is, thus, not “whether the EU should do more”, but rather 
“what is the most desirable distribution of competences between different levels of 
governance?”” 
 
Begg et al. (2001, p. 26) 
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9. A closer look at Europe 
To assess the optimal division of responsibilities for social security it is necessary to take 
a closer look at Europe. How does Europe look like with respect to the distinguished 
relevant factors? In this sector an analysis of these factors is provided based on the 
empirical economic literature. 
Section 9.1 deals with the preferences of the Europeans and section 9.2 with the race to 
the bottom argument. In section 9.3 economies of scale are further investigated and 
section 9.4 pays attention to political economy considerations. Section 9.5 concludes. 
 
9.1 Preferences 
An important factor by the determination of whether European influence on social 
security could be welfare improving are the preferences people have for social security 
and the differences of preferences between countries. If European altruism takes place, 
the (decentral) preference matching argument loses weight. However, an assumption of 
European altruism seems to be in contrast with reality. Mau (2005, p. 81) shows –based 
on Eurobarometer studies- that especially people in Scandinavian countries, where social 
security levels are the highest of Europe, oppose against a European social security 
system: “The results suggest that the institutionalised mode of national solidarity cannot 
be converted into European solidarity; on the contrary, since the European project 
challenges the arrangements of national security, Scandinavians are rather reluctant to 
support a joint European social policy”. 
With respect to (vertical and horizontal) redistribution and insurance based on income 
solidarity it may therefore be expected that preference matching is an important 
argument.86  
 
With respect to the preferences for ways to finance pensions (completely public, with a 
defined benefit or defined contribution system) the initial circumstances in a country are 
important for the preferences of people (Van Groezen et al., 2006). Based on 
Eurobarometer surveys, these authors investigate the preferences for reforms and show 
that not only between, but also within countries preferences for pension financing 
differ.87 Therefore a European pension system may not be a good idea, while flexible 
integration –according to the preferences of the people- may be the most feasible 
outcome (Van Groezen et al., 2006). 
Also with respect to health and social welfare a large majority of the European people 
prefer that policies in these areas are attributed to the national level. Ahrens et al. (2006) 
show this in their analysis of Eurobarometer surveys. However, new member states, 
Spain, Greece and Italy are relatively stronger supporters of a European influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 In chapter 7 the example of Bolton and Roland (1996) was cited where the United Kingdom saw 
European integration as “socialism through the backdoor”, while Scandinavian countries saw integration as 
a threat to the welfare state. 
87 Differences in preferences within a nation are especially relevant in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
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Different welfare states 
The differences in revealed preferences for the amount of social security provision are 
also reflected in the different kinds of welfare states that are present in the European 
countries (De Mooij, 2006). The concept of a social union is even misleading, according 
to Sapir (2006). European social models differ a lot. He distinguishes the Anglo-Saxon, 
the Nordic, the Continental and the Mediterranean models.88 The Anglo-Saxon system is 
characterised by an efficient economy, with weak unions and a centralised provision of a 
minimum level of social security. Inequality is relatively great. The Nordic countries 
combine an efficient economy with high labour participation rates, high taxes, strong 
unions and relatively less inequality. These two systems are efficient. The traditional 
trade-off between efficiency (Anglo-Saxon) and equity (Scandinavian) exists between 
these systems, see figure 4. The other two systems are inefficient and reforms are 
needed.89 The continental countries have insurance (Bismarckian) based systems. Unions 
are relatively strong. The Mediterranean countries spend the money especially on 
pensions. Early retirement and employment protection are important. Countries with 
these systems need major reforms. They are not “sustainable” according to Sapir (2006). 
Figure 4 shows the country systems and their performance. 
 
        Figure: 4 Country systems and performances 
 
 
Source: Sapir (2006) 
 
EU-altruism 
Preferences can differ, but there can still be altruism on the EU-level. However, when the   
amount of social security spending within countries and redistributive EU-funds (on 
structural funds e.g.) are compared, there are little indications of the importance of EU-
altruism. Furthermore, the extensive debates about the UK rebate and the net contribution 
of the Netherlands show that altruism seems to be much more important on the member 
state level than on the European level. 
 
                                                 
88 Where the Nordic countries are Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands; Anglo-Saxon countries 
are: Ireland and United Kingdom; the Continental countries are Austria, Belgium, France Germany and 
Luxembourg and the Mediterranean countries are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
89 This is in line with De Mooij (2006), who evaluates policy options for the Netherlands. He shows that a 
centralised, collective responsibility (Scandinavian) system scores well as does the centralised individual 
responsibility (Anglo-Saxon) approach, while the decentralised collective responsibility (continental) 
approach is less efficient than the Anglo-Saxon and less redistributive than the Scandinavian approach. 
These are (roughly) equal to respectively the first two and the continental models of Sapir (2006). 
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Conclusion 
Based on these surveys, it can be concluded that preferences in Europe for the amount of 
social security provision for all instruments of social security differ substantially. This is 
also reflected in the different welfare states of the European countries. The majority of 
inhabitants does not want a shift of responsibilities for social security instruments to 
Europe. As such, there is no indication that Europeans ask for social security instruments 
provided at the European level, nor that they have equal preferences. Therefore, 
preference matching on the member state level is still an important argument in the 
discussion about the optimal decision level of social security. 
 
9.2 Race to the bottom 
To prevent a race to the bottom, it is often argued that Europe should have influence on 
social policies. In this section it is investigated of this race to the bottom is a theoretical 
argument only, or that it really exists in practice.  
Swank et al. (2003) present a literature review on economic integration in Europe. The 
authors argue that labour mobility between countries is theoretically more relevant than 
capital mobility when considering the optimal decision level for social security. 
However, labour mobility between nations is of less importance in the EU (Swank et al., 
2003). They state that the movement of workers between member states was limited to 
0.1 per cent of the population in 2000, which can be judged as relatively low, both from  
an economic as well as an international point of view.90 
De Giorgi and Pellizari (2006) investigate if social welfare tourism in Europe is a motive 
for migration. In their investigation from 1994 till 2001, they find –based on the 
European Community Household Panel and the OECD data-base on benefit entitlements 
and replacement rates in the different countries- that this is the case in Europe. However, 
only a small proportion of the movements can be clarified by this tourism. The authors 
state e.g. that wages are approximately ten times as important as a motive for migration 
than social security levels.91 
However, De Giorgi and Pellizari also state that the negative effects of migration 
combined with an adverse shock may outweigh the benefits of efficient migration in a 
simulation model.92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2002) state in their analysis that the movement of workers between member 
states is limited to 0.4 per cent of the population per year.  
91 The authors also state it in this way: when comparing the rise of wages and the rise of welfare benefits in 
a country by one standard deviation, the rise in welfare benefits induces only 27 per cent of the migration 
effect of the rise in wages. 
92 However, these simulations are very stylised. The authors assume two potential migration countries. An 
exogenous unemployment shock (that differs for both countries) and thereafter a reduction in welfare 
benefits in the adversely hit country and an increase in these benefits in the other country. Then, the 
allocative benefits of migration are outweighed by inefficient social welfare tourism. 
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The low figures for labour mobility suggest that a “race to the bottom” with respect to 
(redistributive) social security instruments is not a serious problem. However, Swank et 
al., (2003) show that capital is relatively mobile within the EU, especially on the longer 
term. Does this induce a social race to the bottom? 
Three empirical studies on the convergence of social expenditure ratios confirm the 
hypothesis that a social race to the bottom in Europe is not manifest. Goudswaard and 
Caminada (2006) even find an increase in average gross public spending levels (as 
percentage of GDP) for the EU-15 between 1980-2001 (see table 7). 
 
Table 7: Public social spending for selected countries as % of GDP, 1980-2001 
 
               Source: Goudswaard and Caminada (2006) 
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Another analysis of convergence is performed by Bouget (2003). He found convergence, 
but not to the bottom in the empirical analysis. Bouget suggests that reductions in relative 
social expenditure ratio’s (social expenditures as percentage of GDP) possibly follow 
from economic recession rather than from (radical) changes in countries’ social security 
systems, because of policy competition.  
Adelanto and Cuevas (2006) state that although there is no social race to the bottom, 
there seems to be a relative decline in social expenditure ratio’s in purchasing power 
parity per head in Europe. Countries with relatively low social security provision increase 
their expenditures and countries with relatively high social expenditures relatively 
decrease their social expenditures between 1995 and 2001, according to their measure. 
According to the authors, a convergence towards the middle with respect to social 
security could be seen in this period. 
 
Fiscal pressure 
However, mobile labour can lead to pressure on social security systems. The cost of 
inefficient social welfare tourism may outweigh the gains from efficient migration. This 
was also reflected in section 8.3 by the direct fiscal impact of immigrants in West 
Germany and Sweden. Therefore, delayed integration (or the home-country principle for 
a certain period of time) formed by the national governments with respect to horizontal 
and vertical redistribution and insurances based on income solidarity seems to be 
adequate. Furthermore, with the OMC policy learning and pressures for efficient reforms 
can occur between member states, without an inefficient transformation of power to the 
European level. 
The low figures for labour mobility suggest that a “race to the bottom” with respect to 
social security expenditures is not a serious problem. Different empirical studies support 
the view that a social “race to the bottom” does not occur in Europe. Furthermore, market 
distortions may be exported when redistribution policies are centralised in the European 
context. However, low rates of labour mobility may also have (fiscal) consequences on 
member states, which may require some central (co-ordination) policies. 
 
Capital mobility 
Although the assumptions of Perotti (2001) are very specific, Europe’s characteristics 
seem to fit well to this model. Capital is relatively mobile, while labour is not (Swank et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, Sapir (2006) showed that there are substantial differences 
between the efficiency of the economy of the different European countries. Combined 
with the ageing of the population (and therefore a majority of voters, who will possibly 
vote for more redistribution) a centralisation of redistribution policies might therefore 
lead to an export of market distortions from inefficient to efficient countries.  
Thereby, capital mobility may lead to the export of negative effects between countries 
with different pension systems, as was shown in chapter 6. Furthermore, mobile capital 
may –in very specific circumstances- even lead to a social “race to the top” as was argued 
in chapter 5. All these analyses lead to a pledge for some central co-ordination to reduce 
negative external effects to increase welfare. This may be especially important with 
respect to the diverse pension systems.93 
                                                 
93 As was argued, the assumptions to come to a “race to the top” are very demanding. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence discussed in this section does not show that the race to the top occurs at present. 
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9.3 Economies of scale 
According to a (very) general analysis of Dekker et al. (2003) economies of scale with 
respect to European social security provision are not expected. The authors state that 
economies of scale due to a more efficient implementation not seem to occur. The four 
largest countries in the EU have to spend more on social security to reach the same 
reduction in inequality than the smaller countries. This fact provides no support for the 
hypothesis that there are economies of scale with respect to implementation of social 
security, according to the authors.94  
 
With respect to insurance based on reciprocity there seems to be a greater potential for 
Europe. For supplementary pensions for mobile workers there seems to be room for a 
European scheme. There may be economies of scale from reducing administrative 
procedures. In a case study of 25 multinational businesses PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2002) argues that one of the key barriers to labour mobility is formed by international 
differences between pension schemes. According to this research, they are difficult to 
transfer between nations and not standardised at all, which reduces efficient migration. 
Moreover, a broader risk pool may enhance efficiency further. The usual costs of 
centralising -less preference matching- are minimal because it is an actuarial fair 
insurance.95 Furthermore, it may be expected that moral hazard problems with respect to 
pensions are not very relevant factors.96 And as was argued in chapter 6, adverse 
selection problems do not arise when pension have actuarial fair conditions. So there may 
be room for an efficiency enhancing flexible integration between some countries or 
specified groups. However, the question may be raised if the arguments to provide this 
scheme publicly are strong (Ferrera, 2003). With a well-developed legal framework it 
may become a form of a (more) private insurance mechanism. 
 
Risk solidarity 
The moment for a European provision of insurances based on risk solidarity seems not to 
be there right now. However, the case for unemployment, disability and health insurances 
does not have to be the same. Indeed, when the risk pool and the degree of (risk sharing) 
altruism between the different European countries are big enough and intra-industrial 
European trade emerges, a European unemployment benefit system could be an 
alternative. In their literature review Swank et al. (2003) show that a nuanced picture 
arises with respect to specialisation and diversification in the EU-15. Intra-industrial trade 
seems to be reduced between 1970 and 1997. However, Europe can be seen as a 
continent where intra-industrial trade is an important characteristic.97 Of course, still 
                                                 
94 However, the measure used (total social security spending) is indeed very rough, while the dependent 
variable “inequality” does not represent all the functions of social security. So, this empirical evidence must 
be considered with prudence. 
95 Indeed it was shown by Van Groezen and et al. (2006) that preferences for pension funding are different 
in Europe. However, it was also shown that there are groups of regions, countries and people who have the 
same preferences. Flexible integration can than be an attractive possibility. 
96 Indeed, it is difficult to see living longer to profit optimal from pensions as “moral hazard”. 
97 For most European countries more than 50 per cent of the trade can be characterised as intra-industrial 
trade; which means that a country imports as well as exports products from a certain economic industrial 
sector (Swank et al., 2003). The other way around: a comparison for industrial specialisation (where the 
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there are differences between countries. Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have 
relatively (strong) specialised production sectors. Furthermore, the new member states 
differ from the EU-15 (Verkaart and Mul, 2006). Nonetheless, from 1999-2002 the 
authors show a strong convergence of production structures in these countries due to 
more trade integration. So the picture changes when the new member states are included, 
but at the same time there are indications for a converging trend. 
Given the relatively high intra-industrial trade there may be arguments for an efficient 
unemployment risk pool at the European level. However, with the new member states 
production structures within the EU are less diversified. These countries may be 
confronted with (continuing) adverse shocks.  
Furthermore, Fatás (1998) analyses in an empirical study that the gains of interregional 
risk sharing are often overestimated. European countries have relative big government 
budgets, which can insure a large part of the fluctuations. Moreover, the introduction of 
an efficient risk sharing system in Europe is rather complex. Risk sharing can evolve in 
permanent redistribution and, when not properly defined, even to redistribution from the 
poor to the rich regions. Fatás (1998) states that the probable small gains -if any- do not 
weigh against the losses of a European interregional insurance mechanism.  
Furthermore, there are other arguments against a European unemployment system. As 
was shown, there are large differences in preferences in the EU. Therefore, it seems not 
to be welfare improving to develop such a European system now. In addition, reforming 
the diverse systems will come with substantial costs. The national autonomy, combined 
with delayed integration and the European OMC seems to be a more reasonable 
alternative under the current circumstances. Nevertheless, with continual convergence 
and an increase in labour mobility the arguments for a European unemployment system 
can become stronger.  
 
With respect to health and disability insurance the number of asymmetric shocks that an 
economy faces is irrelevant. Here the quality of health care and level of insurances in the 
member states is different (as are the premiums).98 However, there may be some (semi-) 
private parts of health care insurance that can optionally be provided at the European 
level, especially where economies of scale and / or specialisation benefits can be 
reached.99 Indeed, flexible integration may also here lead to an efficient outcome. This 
may hold less for disability insurances, because adverse selection is certainly relevant 
here. Flexible integration then raises financing and / or provision problems with respect 
to disability insurances.100 Further research to the specific characteristics and 
circumstances of social security instruments based on risk solidarity is needed to come to 
solid conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gini-coefficient is 1, if specialisation is complete) shows that between 1994 and 1997 industrial 
specialisation in the EU was 0.26 and in the United States 0.37. 
98 See the discussion about the “pensionado’s”. 
99 Dutch people who move to Spain or Germany for medical treatment are an example of this. 
100 Indeed, this certainly holds for (substantial parts of) health care insurances also. 
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9.4 Political economy 
Political economy considerations are relevant when considering the optimal decision 
level for social security. Does the EU act like a Leviathan, are member states more 
corrupt (with respect to social security) than the EU should be, on which government 
level do lobby groups have more influence? However, it is not easy to draw general 
conclusions about political economy related cases, or as Persson et al. (1996, p. 3) state:  
“…when allowing for political economy considerations, straightforward normative 
conclusions on the appropriate degree of centralisation are much more difficult to draw. 
The use of generalised second best arguments requires a case by case approach and 
careful empirical analysis to measure the pros and cons of centralisation and 
decentralisation”. 
 
This careful empirical case by case approach is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, 
the objective is to extend the existing (global) fiscal federalism framework with the 
functions of social security. An analysis of social security instruments in the specific 
political economy context is therefore left for further research.101 
However, one of the prominent relevant political economy factors of the EU is the 
constitutional design. The EU is not a federation. It can be described by democratic 
federalism, which may not be appropriate to fully decide about social security issues. As 
was argued in chapter 7 “the riding of the commons” and “I’ll-scratch-you-back-if-
you’ll-scratch-mine” policies do especially exist in this type of “federalism”. Moreover 
bureaucrats may not be in the position to decide about highly political (social security) 
issues.  
Further, complementarities are relevant. The European policies with respect to the 
common market sometimes have direct effects on social security policies (Persson et al., 
1996; Geelhoed, 2004). This is –of course- related to the discussion about delayed 
integration. Indeed, the free movement of people can be a threat for social security 
policies. Again, analysing the consequences of EU-laws in detail is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, Ferrera (2003) provides an institutional-historical approach to the 
current sharing of responsibilities in Europe. 
Ferrera developed a scheme in which he distinguished the changing responsibilities in 
Europe for different instruments of social security, see figure 5. 
 
                                                 
101 To analyse this thoroughly, next to the specific circumstances of all social security instruments the 
specific political economy situation in all member states must be compared with the political economy of 
the EU. 
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Figure 5: Responsibilities in Europe’s social security 
 
         Source: Ferrera (2003) 
 
Based on the boundary theories of Rokkan the author describes the different boundaries 
between social security instruments and relates this to Europe’s geographical space.102 
The territorial dimension is represented by the horizontal axes. Geographical and physical 
borders and the rules that are related for passing these borders are relevant here. Because 
of the institutional setting and the four freedoms of movement, the EU has (in)direct 
influence on the social security systems of the member states. The territorial dimension 
consists of: sub-national, national, EU and extra EU space. 
On the vertical axes, we see the “membership dimension”. This dimension sketches the 
diverse membership pillars of social security. From first-pillar (general, tax financed and 
compulsory) benefits, to second-pillar (occupational, supplementary) and third-pillar 
(private) schemes. 
 
Ferrera argues that the core of social sharing systems is not really affected by European 
policies right now. Following Rokkan’s historical approach the author claims that these 
spaces were developed on a national scale in history and are “frozen landscapes”. Indeed, 
the spaces A, d and D have (quite) close borders with other countries of Europe. 
However, due to the free mobility of people it is possible to enter from other European 
countries and get social benefit rights from another member state. The small, dashed gap 
                                                 
102 According to Ferrera (2003), Rokkan investigated the formation of states and nations from a historical 
perspective. Rokkan considered the complex development of Europe from a functional and territorial 
approach. 
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between A and E indicates that this is still not easy to realise and has a (relatively) small 
influence on member states first-pillar social security systems.103 
For more recently developed second-pillar instruments, especially pensions and health 
care, endogenous as well as European developments lead to smaller geographical and 
membership dimensions. Therefore, the lines between B and E are broken. A European 
market for second-pillar insurance contracts is nearby. For private insurance (C), a 
European market is already in place, due to the liberalisation of the insurance market. 
Space E is the “underlying floor on which national spaces rest”. Ferrera shows that a 
couple of authors state that the EU paid attention to market-preserving policies instead of 
market-breaking or positive integration. There are however cases, where the EU (or its 
judges) facilitates that member states can still provide social security in the way they 
prefer.  
 
Ferrera (2003) argues further that tensions will arise between public and private and / or 
basic and supplementary pensions. He states that for countries such as the United 
Kingdom, with a small first-pillar and a large amount of private pensions, the changes are 
not that substantial. On the other hand, in countries like Italy, where pensions are largely 
publicly financed, the expansion of supplementary pensions will lead to pressure on the 
system. The author also claims that the highest pressure is on the Scandinavian model, 
because this system is based on high uniform pensions. The tendency to more multiform, 
individualistic systems will there result in a greater role of private insurance mechanisms 
in social security provision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 The closed line between D and E explains the existing system that non-country members have no rights 
on means tested benefits. The small “d” shows that (some) regions within countries have some freedom to 
redistribute to their poor. However, the dashed and open part between d and D shows that people are free to 
move and have the same rights as other members of their country. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
When taking a closer look at Europe one can see that preferences for all functions of 
social security seem to differ to a great extent within the EU and sometimes even within 
countries. Furthermore, labour mobility is relatively low and there is some evidence that 
a race to the bottom with respect to social security does not occur. Thus in general, there 
seem to be few arguments for a centralisation of social security policies in Europe. 
 
Intra-district trade is relatively great in the EU. The risk pool for unemployment may 
therefore be relatively efficient, also with the new member states. However, given the 
differences in preferences for social security provision in the EU and implementation 
problems a European risk sharing system does not seem to be a welfare enhancing 
solution. 
 
When complementarities arise it is interesting to analyse what the role of the EU could 
be, especially if the subsidiarity principle and the “four freedoms of movement” conflict. 
Indeed, allocative intra-EU migration can raise total welfare, but social welfare migration 
may reduce it. Therefore it is needed to think about cooperation between governments 
and / or a European influence. This can be done by Europe to give member states the 
possibility for delayed integration measures. As was already shown in chapter 8, this is 
sometimes more, sometimes less practice at present. With respect to the most 
redistributive parts of social security policies, this delayed integration may be a welfare 
enhancing compromise. Indeed, when social insurance is actuarial fair, there is no reason 
for delayed integration. Moreover, in this case, the risk pool may be broadened and there 
may be economies of scale from reducing administrative problems with respect to these 
social security instruments. 
 
Ferrera (2003) shows that borders are (more) open between supplementary and voluntary 
schemes. A flexible approach can accommodate efficient migration by providing 
economies of scale. Countries and groups of people differ to a great extent in their 
preferences for social security instruments. However, there may be groups (in different 
countries) who have the same preferences. When adverse selection can be mitigated (to 
an acceptable extent) flexible European systems may be welfare improving. This implies 
that -to prevent adverse selection- these are probably the least redistributive parts of 
social security.  
 
Great differences in preferences, low labour mobility rates and lacking evidence for a 
race to the bottom make the arguments for a role for Europe with respect to social 
security policies not convincing. Due to complementarities and economies of scale for 
insurances based on solidarity of chance, there are however some cooperative proposals 
that have welfare improving potential. Furthermore, as was shown in chapter 8, the OMC 
may theoretically provide some economies of scale for all functions of social security. 
In the next chapter the extended framework for the attribution of the different functions 
of social security in Europe will be discussed, based on this empirical overview. 
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10. An extended framework for Europe 
In this chapter an extended framework is developed to determine the optimal decision 
level for social security in Europe. Hereby, an answer is given to the first research 
question raised in the introduction. 
This framework is based on the five functions of social security described in chapter 3 
and on the theoretical analysis of the relevant factors that determine the optimal decision 
level for social security in chapters 4-7. Moreover, the analysis of the different forms of 
cooperation that were assessed in chapter 8 is included in this framework. At last, the 
closer look at Europe from the previous chapter is used. 
 
10.1 An extended framework for Europe 
The extended framework to determine the optimal way to divide responsibilities between  
different government levels for social security in Europe is represented by figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Social security functions and its attribution in Europe 
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The different degrees of centralisation are given on the x-axes: from a national provision  
to delayed integration and the OMC, to flexible integration and a European provision. In 
chapter 8, it was argued why matching grants and minimum harmonisation levels does 
not seem to be welfare improving proportionality measures. Therefore, these “in between 
solutions” are not included in figure 6. Furthermore, it can be questioned if “delayed 
integration” is really a proportionality measure. However, given the tensions between the 
“four freedoms”, the no-discrimination requirements and the subsidiarity principle, the 
EU could decide to leave room for delayed integration with respect to social security 
instruments, or to give priority to the principle of “freedom of movement”. Therefore, it 
was argued that delayed integration can be seen as cooperation between different 
governments levels. 
On the y-axes the factors that are relevant to determine the optimal decision level for 
social security are given. These factors (economies of scale, externalities, preference 
matching and political economy considerations) are all relevant as was shown in chapters 
4-7. 
The five functions of social security are all connected to the relevant factors and the 
diverse degrees of centralisation. Now, Figure 6 will be explained more profoundly.  
 
Economies of scale 
In chapter 9 the importance of the different relevant factors for Europe was assessed. It 
was shown that economies of scale can be reached by reducing administrative procedures 
and forming efficient risk pools. This may especially be interesting for insurances based 
on solidarity of chance. Broadening the risk pool and paying actuarial fair contributions 
may indeed be efficient. Thereby, administrative procedures for (second-pillar) pensions 
are a serious horde for efficient migration (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002). In the 
previous chapter it was analysed that with respect to other social security functions, 
economies of scale are more difficult to reach. Monitoring moral hazard on a European 
level may be more problematic and implementation gains are not expected (Dekker et al., 
2003).  
A cooperation method that can provide economies of scale is the OMC. As was argued in 
chapter 8 naming and shaming, peer pressure and policy learning may provide some 
economies of scale, without taking responsibilities away from the member states. The 
OMC may therefore with respect to all functions of social security be an interesting, 
possibly welfare enhancing, method. 
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Externalities 
Capital is relatively mobile in Europe, while labour is still relatively immobile. Thereby, 
the “race to the bottom” seems not to be a real threat in Europe under current 
circumstances. However, also relatively small labour mobility may have consequences 
for member states. Especially with respect to the most redistributive social security 
functions: horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurances based on income 
solidarity. Therefore cooperation between countries –as proportionality measures- may be 
welfare improving. Delayed integration may be a reasonable alternative. 
For insurances based on risk solidarity the same arguments may be relevant, because bad 
risks can be attracted to member states that provide generous insurances. This does not 
hold for insurances that are based on reciprocity. Indeed, when people pay an actuarial 
fair contribution, labour mobility does not lead to negative externalities.104  
 
Preference matching 
Preferences between member states for social security differ to a large extent within the 
EU for all kinds of social security provision. Preference matching is thus an important 
factor that pledges for a decentral provision of social security. It seems also to be the case 
that EU-altruism is not a serious force in this discussion, as was analysed in chapter 9. 
However, preferences are measured for whole groups of people within countries and / or 
regions. Yet, it is not implausible that certain groups of people (or certain countries) may 
prefer flexible integration for specific functions of social security. Indeed, European 
workers face problems with assuring their pensions. Moreover, there may be economies 
of scale by the provision of a European pension for mobile workers. A flexible 
integration for certain groups with respect to actuarial fair pensions may therefore be 
welfare enhancing, because there are no negative externalities and economies of scale can 
be reached. It may be expected that preference matching for actuarial fair social security 
instruments is not that important. Indeed, people can choose their preferred “social 
security” and reveal their own preferences then.  
 
Political economy 
Political economy considerations remain important, but must be assessed very precise for 
the different functions and instruments of social security. However, some European 
characteristics could be distinguished. Due to the constitutional design, Europe seems not 
well-equipped to decide about social security issues. Thereby, common pool problems 
may arise.  
With respect to insurances based on the solidarity of chance, political economy 
considerations are less important, because when it is more efficient, this insurance can be 
provided by private parties too.105 
 
 
                                                 
104 Indeed, as was analysed the effects may even be positive due to broadening the risk pool and therefore 
make it more efficient. 
105 However, when one comes to the implementation, the world is not that simple and problems will arise. 
See e.g. the differences in pension systems and rules in Europe. To what extent should second-pillar 
pensions be obligated? Another problem –which is heavily debated nowadays- is the freedom that 
(international) pension funds should have in their investment strategies. 
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Most redistributive functions 
With respect to the most redistributive functions of social security (vertical and horizontal 
redistribution and insurance based on income solidarity) it was shown that preference 
matching is important, while economies of scale are not plausible. So, provision on the 
member states’ level would be optimal from a public economic point of view. 
Furthermore, labour migration may induce (some) externalities and it could therefore be 
welfare improving to follow the principle of delayed integration to reduce inefficient 
migration. In addition, the OMC can theoretically induce (some) economies of scale by 
policy learning and naming and shaming. Precise political economy considerations may 
be relevant, but must be considered in greater detail for all specific social security 
instruments. However, it was shown that the EU constitutional design may not be 
appropriate for social security polices. Therefore, horizontal and vertical redistribution 
and insurances based on income solidarity are placed in the area, where the factors 
“preference matching”, “externalities” and “political economy” are relevant. “Economies 
of scale” are not expected and therefore the area of these functions does not include this 
factor. On the horizontal axes, it is shown that “national”, “OMC” and “delayed 
integration” are relevant. The most redistributive social security functions should be left 
to the member states. However, some economies of scale could be provided by the OMC 
and to prevent negative fiscal effects of labour migration delayed integration may be a 
welfare enhancing policy. 
 
Insurance based on solidarity of chance 
With respect to social insurance based on solidarity of chance some economies of scale 
from further European integration may be reached. Preference matching for actuarial fair 
insurances may be expected to be less important and the same holds for political 
economy considerations. Flexible integration for specific groups may be a welfare 
enhancing policy. Given the large differences in preferences for European pension 
systems a total Europeanization of second-pillar pensions may not be welfare enhancing. 
Differences in the existing pension designs between countries may induce enormous 
adjustment costs and provides a second argument against total Europeanization. 
Therefore, also insurances based on solidarity of chance are not included in the 
“European” area in figure 6.  
The OMC may also with respect to insurances based on solidarity of chance provide 
some economies of scale and therefore lies within the area. 
 
Insurances based on risk solidarity 
With respect to insurances based on risk solidarity all factors are relevant: political 
economy considerations, preference matching, externalities and economies of scale. The 
optimal decision level for these insurances depends on the specific circumstances of 
instruments.  
  
The time for a European provision of insurances based on risk solidarity appears not to be 
there right now. On the other hand, the case for unemployment, disability and health 
insurances is not the same. Indeed, when the risk pool and the degree of (risk sharing) 
altruism between the different European countries are big enough and intra-European 
trade emerges, a European unemployment benefit system could be an alternative. 
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Nevertheless, there are large differences within current preferences in the EU, so it seems 
not to be welfare improving to develop such a European system now. The national 
autonomy, combined with delayed integration and the European OMC appears to be a 
more reasonable alternative under the current circumstances. 
With respect to health and disability insurance the number of asymmetric shocks that an 
economy faces is irrelevant. It was argued that some economies of scale and / or 
specialisation benefits could possibly be reached by flexible integration with respect to 
some parts of health care insurances. However, adverse selection is a serious threat for 
insurances based on risk solidarity. A more specific analysis of the circumstances is 
needed to draw general conclusion with respect to these social security instruments.  
The considerations in this paragraph lead to the area for insurances based on risk 
solidarity as is shown in figure 6. It is shown that all factors are relevant. Depending on 
the circumstances of the social security instruments different combinations of attribution 
of power to the government levels may be optimal. 
 
Social security instruments 
Based on the analysis in this and the previous chapters an indicative table can be 
provided, which gives an overview of the possible welfare enhancing policy measures 
and the different instruments of social security. This is done in table 8.106 
 
Table 8: Social security instruments and its attribution in Europe 
 National Delayed 
integration 
OMC Flexible 
integration 
EU 
social 
assistance 
x x x   
child benefits x x x   
public old age 
pensions 
x x x   
unemployment 
benefits 
x x x   
supplementary 
pensions 
  x x  
 
From a public economic approach it is again shown that a role for Europe with respect to 
most social security policies should be marginal. Indeed, preferences for redistributive 
instruments for social security are diverse while large externalities are not there. The 
OMC can provide some economies of scale with respect to social security policies. 
Furthermore, Europe should allow member states to choose for kinds of delayed 
integration. Only with respect to supplementary pensions there is a role for flexible 
integration. As was argued, then, adverse selection, moral hazard and preference 
matching become less important factors, while economies of scale may be reached. 
 
                                                 
106 However, health and disability insurances are not included in this table, because these instruments have 
diverse aspects that are relevant to assess whether a kind of European influence would be welfare 
enhancing. Further research is necessary to draw (general) conclusions with respect to these social security 
instruments, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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10.2 Conclusion 
The functions of social security consist of more than redistribution only. In chapter 2 five 
functions were distinguished: horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurance based 
on income solidarity, risk solidarity and the solidarity of chance. Based on the factors that 
are relevant to determine the optimal decision level for government policies, the 
traditional fiscal federalism framework was extended by these functions of social security 
for Europe. 
Furthermore, different ways of cooperation between the EU and member states are taken 
into account as measures of proportionality. 
It was assessed which factors are relevant for which functions, and what forms of 
cooperation may be efficient under which circumstances. Indeed, preference matching is 
relevant for all functions of social security, but may be less important for actuarial fair 
insurances. The same holds for political economy circumstances. Economies of scale are 
not plausible by functions characterised by the most redistributive instruments, but may 
be relevant by more insurance-based functions. For these functions flexible integration 
may make it possible to take advantages of the possibilities of economies of scale, when 
differences in preferences in Europe and / or between groups of people are present. 
The OMC may provide some economies of scale with respect to all functions of social 
security. 
Externalities due to labour mobility are relevant and therefore cooperation measures 
could be taken by the EU and member states. Delayed integration may reduce the 
negative externalities of (inefficient) labour mobility. 
All these considerations are summarised in figure 6. 
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11. Assessing the proposals 
 
Several proposals for a kind of European social security system were formulated 
recently. However a coherent analysis of which functions of social security should be 
provided by the EU and which by the member states was lacking (Cantillon, 2006). This 
analysis was provided in the previous chapters. 
In this chapter several proposals to come to a “Social Europe” will be evaluated 
following the extended framework. To answer the second research question, it is analysed 
which proposals fit the extended public economic approach best. 
 
11.1 Euro-stipendium and basic income 
Schmitter and Bauer (2001) develop a proposal to come to a euro-stipendium for the 
poor. Everyone who earns less than 1/3 of the EU’s average income can get an amount of 
1.000 euro from Europe. This vertical redistributive fund is meant for people who live in 
“extreme poverty”. The euro-stipendium is –according to the authors- ethically justified, 
because it redistributes money to the new member states and to the victims of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Furthermore, the EU committed itself to fight social 
exclusion and to provide a life for everyone in human dignity.107 
With the stipendium, people can feel that European “social citizenship” does really exist. 
The stipendium is distributed by the EU itself and is, for “symbolic” reasons, the same 
for every European who has the right to get it. As such, it is not based on differences in 
purchasing power parities. The stipendium is financed by a reduction of the budget on 
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy. When “extreme poverty” is reduced the authors 
state that the threshold can be shifted to ½ of EU’s average income or in the end even to a 
basic income for every citizen. 
 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2001) criticise the euro-stipendium proposal. It creates 
moral hazard by member states that have an incentive to decrease their policies to reduce 
the number of poor in their countries. Secondly, it creates big, unequal effects for those 
who live nearby the border of getting the stipendium or not. So, a huge poverty trap is 
created. Thirdly, the stipendium is based on a “shaky floor”. When new member states 
enter the EU, average income will change, while the circumstances of the current 
receivers of the stipendium do not. Due to enlargement, parts of the poor of the old 
members states will loose their 1.000 euro, which will create strong political 
(xenophobic) problems. Given these practical problems it may be doubted if Europe can 
provide benefits to the poor more efficiently. It may therefore be questioned if there are 
any economies of scale from a European provision. Furthermore, as the analysis in the 
previous chapters shows, preferences for redistribution throughout the EU differ to a 
large extent.108 With respect to externalities, in general delayed integration is currently 
                                                 
107 The authors also claim that the euro-stipendium is in line with the subsidiarity principle, because major 
social security provisions are left with the member states and the stipendium may reduce the negative 
externalities of European policies (e.g. enlargement and the EMU). However, subsidiarity is not assessed in 
the right way. Indeed, the question is not whether European influence is big or not, but if national 
governments are not able to provide assistance to the poor in a more efficient way. 
108 However, it may be claimed that one of the three social policy goals of the European Employment 
Strategy is reducing poverty. Politicians declared that they want to reduce the number of poor, which could 
be an argument to claim that people have the same preferences in Europe with respect to this policy area. 
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the practice, which does not give immediately rights for immigrants to vertical income 
redistribution in other member states. So, externalities are small. Therefore, there seem to 
be no economic arguments to provide a euro-stipendium to the poor. 
 
Van Parijs and Vanderboght (2001) are less critical about the long-term perspective of 
Schmitter and Bauer (2001). A basic income -or “euro-dividend” as they call it- for all 
Europeans does not have the disadvantage effects of the stipendium and is a promising 
alternative, according to the authors. The level of this “dividend of durable peace” must 
be proportional to the purchasing parity of the euro in the diverse countries.  
However, from an economic approach this “dividend of durable peace” must be seen as 
an expensive political symbol. Indeed, taxes must be raised from Europeans first, which 
implies economic distortions; after which the same people get their (but less) money 
back. Such a proposal would probably be known as a symbol of wasteful Europe instead 
of reflecting a social face. 
 
11.2 Universal child benefits 
Begg et al. (2001) state that the OMC is worthwhile in the present European context, but 
that European social policy should be reinforced in the future. They suggest that this can 
be done with an identifiable, categorical cash benefit, where reaching the goal of 
diminishing social exclusion must be the central issue. A European birth grant could be a 
proposal that fits within these criteria.  
In 2004, the High-Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged European 
Union states that with respect to ageing it is recommended that people can have the 
number of children they desire. This would lead to a greater labour force in the next 
decades. Further, more than a quarter of European children live in a household with a risk 
of poverty (European Commission, 2004). To mitigate this problem, the authors propose 
a basic income for children. This income must be based on a percentage of the median 
income in a country and must be provided by the member states. 
Earlier, Atkinson (1996) did a comparable proposal. In the future a basic income can be 
formed to guarantee a Europe-wide minimum income. However, the author states that a 
good start would be a basic income for children. A minimum should be based on the 
general incomes of member states and the way it is provided (e.g. by tax credits, benefits, 
tax deductions) should be left to the individual countries. So, Atkinson states, subsidiarity 
(in the provision of this good) is guaranteed. The author did the same proposal again in 
2005. 
Inspired by Atkinsons’ idea Levy et al. (2006) made simulation models of a European 
provided child basic income by a flat tax rate. They show that a reduction of child 
poverty by 50 per cent –which is the goal of the European Commission in 2010 
(Matsaganis et al., 2006)- can be reached with a flat tax rate on all non-benefit income 
(including pensions) of about 3 percent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, when this is done, one endogenises the problem. Indeed, then all the proposals politicians accept 
will be efficient from a public economics approach, because they reflect the preferences of the European 
people. However, looking at the studies considered in the previous chapters, there seem to be little support 
for European redistributive policies. 
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With the universal child benefits the authors try to reach the goal of reducing child 
poverty. With this horizontal redistributive proposal again there is no reason to expect 
that there exist economies of scale and / or externalities, which will make a European 
provision more efficient. In fact, especially families with children are less mobile than 
other families, which reduces the negative external effects, if any 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Moreover to reach the goal of reducing child poverty 
with a universal measure is doubtful. Indeed, why subsidise also rich parents when 
reducing poverty is the goal? Furthermore, there is little public support for a direct 
influence of the EU on social security instruments. To conclude: there seem to be no 
gains from a public economic point of view to provide or set minimum standards for 
child support at the European level. 
 
11.3 European pension system 
Chapon and Euzéby (2002) propose to develop a “Social Europe” by a system that 
reflects a greater solidarity at the EU-level. A European minimum pension could be an 
example of that.  
The differences in tax treatment of pensions in the EU can lead to inefficient migration 
(Stevens, 2003). The cash-flow treatment of pensions (the contributions and capital 
income from these contributions are tax-exempt while pension benefits are taxed) is part 
of the problem.109 People have an incentive to tax free save for their pension and migrate 
to a country where pensions are not (or less) taxed. Therefore a harmonisation of pension 
policies in Europe may be welfare improving. However, Stevens states that measures 
must be in line with the free movement of goods, persons and capital and therefore e.g. 
an exit tax for pensioners is not preferred. Or stronger, following EU directives an exit 
tax is even forbidden. Stevens (2003), thus proposes a right of tax for the country where 
pensions were build up. So, application of the source based tax instead of a residence 
based tax on pension benefits. 
 
Ferrera (2003) also considers this second-pillar of pensions. He discusses the evolving 
regulatory developments and evolving laws in the EU and states (p. 639): 
 
“The final and more general conclusion (…) is that the case law and regulatory 
developments so far have had a differential impact on distinct areas or tiers of national 
social protection. Regarding pensions, member states have been able to preserve effective 
barriers around the principle of compulsory membership in public schemes in their first-
pillars (an essential bulkwark for domestic redistribution) but have lost considerable 
grounds at the second-pillar level”. 
 
The residence principle holds for redistribution, but not (or less) for occupational pension 
benefit. Therefore there is room for EU intervention in the second-pillar, Ferrera (2003) 
argues. 
Furthermore uncertainty about pension benefits, because of different pension rules and 
regimes in different countries, may result in over savings by international mobile 
                                                 
109 These benefits are usually taxed at a lower rate than during working age. 
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workers.110 This problem can be related to the proposal of Pieters and Vansteenkiste 
(1993) for a “thirteenth state” with respect to migrants. Ferrera (2003) described that 
European influence on the second-pillar pensions is greater nowadays than it was and he 
expects that pressures on current pension systems will rise. Therefore a voluntary 
European pension system may lead to economies of scale (due to less administrative 
problems and more certainty). Van Groezen et al. (2006) also support a flexible 
integration of pension policies. The authors investigated that opinions about the kind of 
provision of pensions differ to a great extent between – but also within- European 
countries. They state therefore that a complete centralisation of policymaking for 
pensions is not feasible in Europe. However, groups of people and / or countries have the 
same preferences. 
Disadvantages of a flexible pension provision are technical (the compatibility with 
national pension systems) and practical problems (who is responsible, when there are 
fund shortages (Goudswaard and Vording, 1996))? Furthermore, the question must be 
raised if from a political point of view this is the “Social Europe” the different authors 
want. Indeed, possibly the high skilled, high incomes will use this system first, which are 
not the groups that can cause warm feelings by social feeling politicians and scientists.111 
Even the feeling that Europe is only good for the lucky can be strengthened. However, 
this is not the benchmark of this study. The benchmark in this paper is the public 
economic approach. The question is, if the proposals for different kinds of European 
social security can be welfare enhancing and with respect to supplementary pensions this 
seems to be the case. 
 
Minimum pension standards 
Atkinson et al. (2002) investigate the consequences of European minimum old age 
pension standards. Indeed, the income of the elderly consists to a large extent of social 
security. A European minimum pension is meant to prevent poverty under elderly.  
The authors set a minimum pension in purchasing power parities of 40 percent of mean 
equivalent disposable household income in the United Kingdom and show that the 
introduction of a European minimum pension will reduce the number of poor pensioner 
households substantially. 
However, Atkinson et al. (2002) do not look at the dynamic consequences of their 
proposal. What are the behavioural effects of introducing a (relative) minimum pension 
in the member states? The risk of slowing economic and in the end social convergence, 
combined with financial troubles for new member states with respect to minimum social 
security levels, articulated by Sinn and Ochel (2003), are also relevant here. Thereby the 
feasibility problems with minimum standards raised by Goudswaard and Vording (1996) 
come into being. Furthermore the authors themselves doubt whether the goal (reducing 
the number poor) is reached in an efficient manner with this proposal. Given these 
objections, the minimum pension harmonisation does not seem to be a welfare-enhancing 
alternative. 
                                                 
110 When people have to insure themselves, over saving is the usual result (see Heijdra and Van der Ploeg, 
2004).  
111 On the other hand, the free movement of people in the enlarged European Union could –depending on 
the specific institutional form- make such a voluntary pension system interesting also for lower skilled 
people (from new member states) who work in old member states.  
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Nonetheless, differences in pension systems between countries may lead to inefficient 
migration (Lejour and Verbon, 1994; Uebelmesser, 2003). The PAYG income-solidarity 
based systems can –in combination with ageing- get under pressure due to labour 
migration and moving pensioners. Therefore, some co-ordination with respect to public 
old age pensions is needed. A combination of OMC measures and / or delayed rights for 
public old age could provide an optimal policy mix to prevent inefficient migration flows. 
Developments in the relevant production factors (especially labour mobility) should be 
followed, but currently the European policy seems to be adequate. 
 
11.4 Minimum standards for social security 
Dispersyn proposed in 1992 a “social snake”: European social standard benefit levels for 
social security should be agreed on, from which member states should not deviate too 
much (Goudswaard and Vording, 1996). When countries provide too much social 
insurance they have to pay for a fund, while countries that provide too less can draw from 
the fund. The social standard should be raised until the level of the countries with the 
highest protection levels is reached.  
 
The incentive structure of this proposal is perverse. Countries are financially rewarded if 
they provide “too low” levels of social security, while countries that provide “too much” 
are punished. It is difficult to think of a system that has worse incentives to prevent 
policy competition. 
 
11.5 European transfers 
In 1993 Italianer and Vanheukelen proposed a transfer scheme for countries that face an 
asymmetric shock, measured by a substantial increase in unemployment (Goudswaard 
and Vording, 1996). This scheme can reduce the adverse effects of the asymmetric 
shocks of an economic and monetary union as pointed out by Krugman (1991) and can 
thereby stabilise economies of the member states. It was shown in chapter 7 that there are 
serious theoretical arguments against matching grants. Furthermore, as was analysed in 
chapter 9 also empirically the advantages of matching grants funded by a European 
unemployment fund may be outweighed by the disadvantages of the practical 
implementation. 
Drèze (2002) proposed a European matching grants system to subsidise low-skilled 
workers, so that externalities of labour migration can be compensated. 
The same arguments against matching grants are valid here. Therefore, European 
matching grants on social policies should not be advocated. 
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11.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter an answer was formulated to the second research question. Applying the 
extended framework to several proposals in the literature shows that none of the 
proposals should be accepted unconditionally from a public economic approach. A 
European basic income is inefficient in itself (also when it is provided by member states) 
and a stipendium may be criticised, because Europeans have different preferences and 
there are serious feasibility problems. A European child benefit has also to be rejected, 
because preferences for horizontal redistribution are different in Europe and externalities 
are relatively small. Further, a more selective benefit is more efficient to reach the goal of 
reducing (child) poverty than a general payment to every family. 
European minimum rules can even lead to slow social (and economic) convergence. The 
Dyspersyn proposal even has perverse economic effects. 
European transfers should not be advocated, because it is not expected that the conditions 
on which it is efficient to use matching grants are fulfilled. 
Only the oldest proposal -a flexible European pension system- offers the possibility of 
enhancing welfare by providing economies of scale from a larger risk pool and reducing 
administrative procedures. However, also this proposal has some serious administrative 
and political drawbacks. 
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Part V: Conclusion 
 
 
“All member states have well functioning political systems and a variety of redistributive 
instruments at their disposal. It is up to them to decide how, to whom and how much to 
redistribute. In this case the prescriptions of the theory of fiscal federalism, that 
redistribution ought to be centralised, seem inapplicable, at least in the near future”. 
 
Tabellini (2003, p. 90) 
A Social Europe: Political Utopia or Efficient Economics? 
 
102 
12. Conclusion 
Traditional fiscal federalism theories cannot simply be copied and used for Europe. It is 
far too simple to state that the “redistribution branch” should be devoted to the central 
government. Social security consists of more than redistribution. Therefore in this paper 
the traditional fiscal federalism framework was extended with different functions of 
social security: horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurance based on income 
solidarity, risk solidarity and solidarity of chance.   
It was assessed which of these functions could be best attributed to Europe and which 
should be left with the member states. The relevant factors that determine the optimal 
decision level for social security were evaluated. Preference matching, capital and labour 
mobility, economies of scale and political economy considerations are still in the heart of 
the debate. 
Furthermore, co-ordination methods as intermediate policies were assessed. It is analysed 
if and under which circumstances delayed integration, OMC, minimum harmonisation 
standards, European transfers and flexible integration may be welfare enhancing. This is 
in line with the subsidiarity principle -with its proportionality criterion- laid down in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
Concerning functions with the most redistributive elements, the arguments for 
centralisation are rather weak. At present the “race to the bottom” due to mobile 
production factors seems not to occur. Furthermore, economies of scale are not plausible 
and information problems are likely for Europe with respect to the different preferences 
of the people in the member states. However, mobile labour can lead to (fiscal) pressure 
on member states and its social security systems. Therefore, delayed integration (or the 
home-country principle during some period) formed by the national governments with 
respect to horizontal and vertical redistribution and insurances based on income 
solidarity, seems to be adequate. Furthermore, policy learning and pressures for efficient 
reforms (due to the OMC) can occur between member states, without an inefficient 
transformation of power to the European level. 
Proposals for a basic income, euro-dividend or a European child benefit, seem to be 
based on ideological grounds. From an economic point of view there is no need to 
support these ideas. The same holds for minimum harmonisation levels for social 
security. As Sinn and Ochel (2003) analyse, there are –next to feasibility problems- 
considerable negative consequences, possibly even on social convergence.  
 
With respect to insurance based on solidarity of chance, there seems to be a greater role 
for Europe: there is room for a European scheme for supplementary pensions for mobile 
workers. There may be economies of scale from reducing administrative procedures and 
a broader risk pool may enhance efficiency further. The usual cost of centralising, less 
preference matching, is minimal because it is an actuarial fair insurance. Furthermore, 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems may be not that substantial. 
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A European provision of insurances based on risk solidarity is not acute. When the risk 
pool and the degree of (risk sharing) altruism between the different European countries 
are big enough and intra-European trade emerges, a European unemployment benefit 
system could be an alternative. However, there are big differences in preferences in the 
EU and the conditions for welfare improving European unemployment transfers are 
rather stringent. It appears that Europe does not fulfil these conditions, so it does not 
seem to be welfare improving to develop such a European system now. The national 
autonomy, combined with delayed integration and the European OMC seems to fit best to 
the current circumstances.  
On the other hand, there may be some (semi-)private parts of insurances based on risk 
solidarity that can benefit from flexible integration. Especially, when economies of scale 
and / or specialisation benefits can be reached. Nevertheless, differences in preferences, 
adverse selection, moral hazard and practical difficulties may be serious disadvantages. 
Further research is needed to come to convincing conclusions about the (dis)advantages 
of flexible integration of insurance instruments based on risk solidarity. 
 
From a public economic approach there seems to be no urgency to centralise social 
security policies in Europe. The call for a “Social Europe” is more based on ideology 
than on a cost-benefit assessment of the arguments for centralisation. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the least “social” social security instruments (which are based on 
reciprocity) are the first where (flexible) integration can provide benefits. Further 
research could be focused on the optimal conditions under which these insurances can be 
provided in a welfare enhancing way. 
Also concerning the precise conditions for delayed integration and the related tension 
between the European objectives of the four freedoms of movement and the subsidiarity 
principle, detailed analysis on the level of social security instruments may be helpful. 
Thereby, it would be interesting to analyse the specific political economy context with 
respect to social security instruments. Furthermore, the impact of the OMC should be 
assessed. Does it really provide the expected economies of scale, or is it only wishful 
thinking? 
 
In the future things could change. Factors could move. Preferences can shift. 
Constitutional institutions evolve. Future research could be focused on the emergence of 
these processes. However, at this moment, under current circumstances and by using a 
public economic approach, it must be concluded that proposing a “Social Europe” is a 
political utopia rather than efficient economics. 
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